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Abstract
This paper attempts to establish a stronger linkage between neo-extractivism and social
welfare states in contemporary Latin America using both a micro and macro perspective. By
emphasizing the human capital aspect of the welfare state’s role in promoting equitable
redistribution and correcting market failures, this paper attempts to evaluate the extent to which
extractive industries contribute to human capital formation. Due to the sectors’ large influence on
the state and weak capacity to create employment, I develop the concept of the “gilded welfare
state,” defined by the inability of extractive industries to ensure equal opportunity and generate
formal employment despite socioeconomic improvements. Using data from the ECLAC, World
Bank, IMF, Varieties of Democracy, and Penn World Table databases, first differenced OLS
models were conducted of Latin American countries to assess this claim in terms of natural
resource rents and human capital expenditures. While neither analysis finds conclusive results,
they do suggest that extractivism should still be considered as a key determinant when
considering welfare state formation.
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Chapter I. Introduction
In the heart of the Amazon basin of Ecuador by the Andes Mountains and below the
equator lies the Earth’s arguably most biologically diverse spot— The Yasuní National Park.
Declared a UNESCO Biosphere Reserve and Cultural Heritage site in 1989, the Yasuní is the
home of “approximately 600 species of birds, 170 species of mammals, 80 bats, and 150
amphibians” along with “1,100 species of trees” (Blitz 2015). New species are even still being
discovered today. Various indigenous groups such as the Shuar, Kichwa, and Waorani call the
Yasuní home as they have inhabited the area and voluntarily lived in harmony with nature
undisturbed for centuries (Blitz 2015). Yet, the Yasuní is also home to something seemingly
more valuable than nature or tradition — oil.
At the U.N. General Assembly in 2007, former President Rafael Correa of Ecuador
instigated the Yasuní-ITT Initiative to announce his and his state-owned oil company,
PetroEcuador’s, plans for oil extraction in the Yasuní in the name of social development.
Knowing that such a large-scale operation would endanger the unique biodiversity, destroy the
carbon sink, and displace indigenous peoples, Correa extended a revolutionary proposal to the
rest of the world. In exchange for $3.6 billion, or 50% of the oil reserves value, Correa and
PetroEcuador offered to abandon the idea of oil drilling in the Yasuní (Vidal 2016). His aim was
to “set a precedent in the fight against global warming by reducing the high cost to poor
countries of preserving the environment” (Associated Press in Quito 2013). Unfortunately, this
initiative fell on deaf ears throughout the world. Despite the fact that Hollywood stars such as
Leonardo diCaprio and noted environmentalist Al Gore helped contribute to funds raised over
six years, it was not enough to save the Yasuní as only $200 million was raised (Vidal 2016).
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Therefore in 2013, Correa and PetroEcuador scrapped their revolutionary proposal as
their apparent vision for a sustainable economy with renewable jobs and a respectful coexistence
with nature was tarnished. In a nationally televised speech, Correa expressed his disappointment
with the international community for not raising the required funds. He claimed that the world
had failed Ecuador, blaming “the great hypocrisy” of the world’s richest nations who emit the
most greenhouse gases but still expect nations like his to sacrifice social development in the
name of environmental conservation. Therefore, drilling of the Yasuní commenced in 2016
(Vidal 2016).
Yet, oil extraction is not unique to Ecuador. Since the beginning of colonial times over
500 years ago, the economic, social, and political landscape of Latin America has consistently
been determined by the use of extractive industries. Extractivism, or the removal of large
unprocessed or limitedly processed quantities of non-renewable and renewable natural resources
from nature, propagates itself on the essence of unsustainability (Acosta 2013). Whether these
intensive extractive activities stem from oil and mining to agro-industry, forestry, or fishing,
such practices are detrimental to the environment and society. Local communities, indigenous
peoples, and people excluded from the national political community bear the brunt of the social
and economic costs of extractive industries which are rarely, if ever, considered by the extractive
industries’ costs. This includes “global climate change, soil depletion, deforestation, loss of food
sovereignty, declining biodiversity, contamination of freshwater” and a myriad of other
consequences (Burchardt and Dietz 2014). Yet, these extractivist practices generate substantial
revenue, or rent for developing states. Therefore, governments begin extracting and exporting
even more natural resources although they are in fixed supply (Brand 2016). Hailed as the de
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facto economic and developmental model for Latin American states, the relevance of
extractivism in contemporary society stems from its derivation—neo-extractivism.
Originally termed by Uruguayan scholar Eduardo Gudynas as part of his ten theses on the
new Latin American extractivism, neo-extractivism has been suggested to be the contemporary
developmental and economic model of Latin American countries (Gudynas 2009). In many
ways, neo-extractivism maintains the traditional characteristics of classical extractivism in that it
results in environmental and social costs. Yet what truly distinguishes this new extractivism from
the old is the stronger role the state plays in facilitating extractivism for social development.
Such strong control over extraction was especially characteristic of Pink Tide governments, or
the numerous progressive governments who were elected throughout Latin America since the
late 1990s. In the post-neoliberal policies of such governments, Pink Tide governments were
able to “regulate the appropriation of resources and their export by nationalizing companies and
raw materials, revising contracts, and increasing export duties and taxes” (Burchardt and Dietz
2014, 470). With this surplus revenue generated from extraction, “the exploitation of nature
serves to secure national development and sovereignty, to reduce poverty, increase social
participation,” “diversify local economies,” and “guarantee political stability” (Burchardt and
Dietz 2014, 470). This in turn, provides these governments with the legitimacy to continue
increasing extraction for the sake of improving social conditions. Indeed, there were substantial
improvements to the formation of the welfare state that will be discussed throughout this paper.
Yet it is concerning that in times of commodity price fluctuations, Latin American
welfare states seem unable to sustain themselves in the long run. Perhaps no other time best
explains this feat than the emergence of the COVID-19 crisis. As shown in Figure 1.1, prices for
copper, coal, and oil have been decreasing since 2014. Former Colombian finance minister
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Mauricio Cárdenas (2020) reports that the further fall in “global supply and demand for dry bulk
shipping stocks such as building materials and commodities” is “already affecting Latin
American exports.” With the additional decline in economic activity for China1 due to COVID19, Latin America faces lower prices for their commodities. Since Ecuador and Venezuela for
example have great fiscal dependence on oil for example, each $10 “decline in the price
represents a loss of fiscal revenues close to 1 percent” of their GDP (Cárdenas 2020). Brazil,
Colombia, and Mexico lose 0.5 percent of their GDP for the same price decrease (Cárdenas
2020). This loss of revenue has significant implications pertaining to the region’s ability to
publicly finance its welfare states.
Figure 1.1 The Fall in Commodity Prices

1

China accounts for 50% of global demand in copper and nickel and 15% of oil consumption (Cárdenas 2020).
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As contemporary welfare states were already under strain, some are now “taking debt2 to
fund social compensation programs, economic recovery packages and improvements in public
health systems” (Monge 2020). While countries like Brazil and Costa Rica have a universal
health-care system, many still “have large gaps in accessibility caused mainly by out-of-pocket
health expenditure” (Romero 2020). Informal workers “have little access to social protection”
and healthcare and must therefore, continue to work despite any “quarantine and social
distancing measures” (Romero 2020). Such healthcare fragility is accompanied by a less than
inclusive education system. For example, Bolivia’s Education Ministry cancelled the entire
school year as they had “difficulties in reaching students in rural areas with little internet access”
(Gonzalez et al. 2021). Ultimately, Henry Romero (2020) states that “an estimated 231 million
people in Latin America are predicted to be living in poverty by the end of 2020.” This high of a
poverty level was last seen fifteen years ago in 2006 (Romero 2020).
Considering the political economy of contemporary Latin America, this paper
ultimately attempts to establish a stronger and much needed linkage between neo-extractivism
and the Latin American welfare state. By identifying the roles of a typical welfare state in
promoting well-being through decentralized decision making and the correction of market
failures, this paper uncovers two important mechanisms that extractive industries use to
indirectly shape welfare state formation in relation to the state. The first includes its newfound
redistributive responsibility from its influence on the state. The second includes its ability to
generate formalized employment for the state. As neo-extractivism and the welfare state both
contain widespread variations, providing a foundation for a potential connection between these

2

For example, the Inter-American Development Bank loaned $4 billion to Argentina to curtail economic impacts
from the pandemic (Gonzalez et al. 2021).
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two topics is integral in establishing a clearer relationship that can be improved upon by future
scholars.
Unlike other papers, this paper places a stronger emphasis on extractive industries as a
key actor in forming the welfare state. With the global emergence of extractive industries like
Exxon Mobil and Eni in Guyana and Angola whose welfare states are still in development,
researchers may benefit from understanding how extractive industries operate within a state to
promote or hinder social development. Previous research has removed extractive industries from
discussions concerning social development. Though there is research regarding the corporate
social responsibility (CSR), or business practice that holds extractive firms socially accountable
for its practices, they are typically only confined to business-related rationales and justifications
for extractivist practices rather than a genuine interest in social development. Cardno Entrix and
Cardno Latin America, a global consulting firm for extractive industries across Latin America,
believes that extractive firms must merely be “good neighbors” to local communities since it
helps them “operate successfully in the long term” (Aleman 2020). Yet, extractive industries and
firms are an imperative “middle-man” that mediate the relationship between the state and its
people indirectly, playing a larger role than realized even when they are gone.
The paper is broken up into the following sections. In "Chapter II. Latin America Welfare
States," the definition and functions of the traditional welfare are explored and adapted to
contemporary Latin American social policy efforts. In "Chapter III. Neo-extractivism, " the role
of extraction in contemporary Latin America is reviewed and connected to social welfare efforts
in the region. In "Chapter IV. The Gilded Welfare State," two mechanisms of neo-extractivism,
namely its influence on the government’s redistributive power and its limited ability to create
employment are identified in order to explain how neo-extractivism affects the formation of
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the Latin American welfare state in the human capital investment perspective. Both "Chapters V.
Medium-N First Differenced Model” and "Chapter VI. Large-N First Differenced Model”
attempt to empirically establish a direct, quantitative relationship between neo-extractivism and
welfare state quality in terms of extractive industry reliance and human capital investment. The
former operationalizes the primary determinants of welfare state quality and performs a first
difference OLS regression of 33 observations to consider the impact of natural resource rents on
human capital at the beginning and end of each Pink Tide or non-Pink Tide wave of government.
Meanwhile, the latter considers other potential determinants of welfare state quality and
performs a first differenced analysis of 18 Latin American countries followed by a discussion of
key findings. Finally, "Chapter VII. Conclusion" discusses important implications of the findings
and suggestions for future studies.
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Chapter II. Latin American Welfare States
The Traditional Welfare State
I.

Defining the Welfare State
The concept of a welfare state has consistently been debated and refined since its

introduction in the late 1800s and early 1900s. Despite significant discussions on its true
definition, characteristics, classifications, and typologies, the welfare state still remains an
amorphous topic in and of itself in the literature. According to Britannica (2021), the welfare
state is based on principles such as “equality of opportunity, equitable distribution of wealth, and
public responsibility for those unable to avail themselves of the minimal provisions for a good
life.” Therefore, it assumes more responsibility in safeguarding and advocating for the
“economic and social well-being of its citizens” (Britannica 2021).
Asa Briggs (1961, 228) provided the most commonly used definition of the welfare
state. He stated that “the welfare state is a state in which organized power is deliberately used
(through politics and administration) in an effort to modify the play of market forces in at least
three directions.” The first direction includes “guaranteeing individuals and families a minimum
income irrespective of the market value of their work or their property” (Briggs 1961, 228). The
second direction includes providing social protection for the people against large risks such as
unemployment, old age, illnesses, or disabilities to avoid “individual and family crises” (Briggs
1961, 228). The third direction ensures “that all citizens without distinction of status or class are
offered the best standards available to a certain agreed range of social services” (Briggs 1961,
228).
While this is a more comprehensive and traditional definition of the welfare state, there
are certain important structural components to the welfare state that must be emphasized in each
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of them, namely its underlying capitalistic and democratic 3 foundation. In order to unearth the
welfare state’s basic premise and philosophy, it is useful to distinguish the welfare state from the
“neo-liberal,” or market-oriented state. While both states are capitalistic and democratic in
nature, the neo-liberal state in its purest, theoretical sense assumes that markets are Pareto
efficient (Stiglitz 2017). This means that all resources are put to its highest valued use, economic
growth is maximized, all gains from trade are exhausted, and market actors assumed to be acting
in their own self-interest ensure the best outcome for society (Halbac 2020a). Therefore, neoliberal states require limited state intervention to guarantee macroeconomic stability. On the
other hand, the welfare state assumes that markets are generally not Pareto efficient. Therefore, it
requires more state intervention to help correct the market failures in the economy and society
that typically deprive the poor and middle classes of basic necessities.
In addition to this economic aspect of the state, the political aspect of the state lies in the
redistributions of income or wealth (Stiglitz 2018). Redistributions in a neo-liberal state are
lump-sum in nature, meaning that they are given as a one-time payment (Stiglitz 2017). On the
other hand, redistributions in a welfare state are given as a series of payments to people who the
government deems greatly in need of them. As a decentralized decision-making entity,
institutions at different levels of government exercise greater authority and responsibilities over
the management and allocation of financial resources. Therefore, the state’s role becomes much
more active in a welfare state than in a neo-liberal state as it becomes more responsible for the
well-being at all levels.

3

Democracy is not a necessary foundation for establishing an effective welfare state. Yet, this paper will rest on this
assumption since democracies are more inclined to prioritize equal opportunity and encourage citizen participation
through voting, protests, and other forms of contestation.
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This foundation will be explored more fully throughout this paper as these are the central
aspects that allow the welfare state to pursue its objectives. In the meantime for the purposes of
simplicity, a welfare state can be defined as “a political phenomenon in which capitalist societies
create mechanisms to assure social security to citizens in an inclusive and expansive democracy”
(Fleury 2017, 2). Through mechanisms such as the distribution of revenues and services, antipoverty programs, and public provisions of basic necessities, the welfare state may be able to
alleviate the existing deprivations in society. Though this definition does not encompass all of
the necessary functions of the welfare state, it brilliantly captures the essence of what this paper
will be addressing in terms of state intervention and societal well-being.
II.

Typologizing the Welfare State
Perhaps one of the most recognized works in the welfare state literature is Danish

sociologist Gøsta Esping-Andersen’s (1990) The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. In his
widely accepted book, Esping-Andersen differentiated between European welfare regimes using
his own influential typology based on the levels of decommodification and stratification.
Decommodification “occurs when a service is rendered as a matter of right, and when a person
can maintain a livelihood without reliance on the market” (Esping-Anderson 1990, 21-22). When
a state has high decommodification, or low commodification, this means that individuals are able
to uphold a certain acceptable standard of living without selling their labor in the labor market.
Most Nordic countries are highly decommodified. When a state has low decommodification, or
high commodification, individuals must sell their labor by participating in the labor market if
they hope to uphold their standard of living. There is little to no access to services such as
unemployment compensation, socialized medicine, or retirement benefits. The United States for
example, is highly commodified.
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On the other hand, stratification refers to the extent to which the state differentiates
between which social groups receive what benefits. For example, citizens may be entitled to
unemployment insurance but undocumented immigrants may not. Or, those who work in the
formal sector may be entitled to contributory pension plans but workers in the informal sector
may not. Ideally, welfare states hope to achieve low stratification in which everyone receives
access to benefits, regardless of gender, religion, occupation, race, and other characteristics.
With these two criteria in mind, Esping-Andersen notably distinguishes between the
liberal, conservative, and social democratic welfare states (Esping-Andersen 1990). Liberal
welfare states were classified by low decommodification and low stratification, conservative
states were classified by low decommodification and high stratification, and social-democratic
states were classified by high decommodification and low stratification (Esping-Andersen 1990).
Though Esping-Andersen’s typology was confined to modern European states, this core criteria
was applied to non-European states as well.
Latin American Welfare States
I.

Typologizing Latin American Welfare States
The first person to apply Esping-Andersen’s typology of welfare states to the Latin

American context was Fernando Filgueira (2005). Referring to the system of social assistance
and services as social states instead of welfare states, Filgueira made a compelling case for his
classification of welfare efforts in Latin America. Using the study of Carmelo Mesa-Lago (1991)
who distinguished Latin American social security efforts into pioneer, intermediate, and
latecomer states, Filgueira was able to complement Mesa-Lago’s work while also creating his
own typology (Filgueira 2005, 11). Considering both human capital investment and investment
criteria until the 1970s as the basis of his work, Filgueira found three regional patterns based on
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“coverage, benefits, requirements, and stratification of services” (Franzoni 2008). The first
consists of “stratified universalism” and included states such as Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay
(Filgueira 2005, 13). Though states within this pattern had established and extended policies
such as universal access to primary education and basic health services to a vast majority of their
populations, these policies were stratified according to one’s occupation (Filgueira 2005,
69). The second pattern consists of “exclusionary” states such as Honduras and Nicaragua
containing “residual states and almost nonexistent public redistribution of resources” (Franzoni
2008, 69). The third pattern consists of “dual” states such as Brazil and Mexico which can be
thought of as a hybrid between the first two patterns since it contains both “stratified
universalism in urban areas and exclusion in rural ones” (Franzoni 2008, 69).
Based on Filgueira’s findings, scholars Evelyne Huber and John Stephens (2005)
reviewed Latin American social policies that focused on increasing both social protection and
human capital formation (Franzoni 2008). By considering coverage, expenditure levels, and
social investment allocation, Huber and Stephens were eventually able to group several Latin
American states according to their fiscal effort and extent of coverage (Franzoni 2008). Chile
showed the highest levels of fiscal effort and coverage followed by Argentina, Uruguay, and
Costa Rica as the first cluster, Brazil and Mexico as the second cluster, Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru,
Columbia, and Venezuela as the third cluster, and Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and
Nicaragua as the fourth cluster (Franzoni 2008). Unlike Filgueira, Huber and Stephens (2005)
actively refer to Latin American social policy efforts as emerging welfare states.4 This suggests
that the welfare state is in the formation of being developed, an assertion that this paper will
adopt and build upon.

4

Latin American welfare states have also been called in transition welfare states (Esping-Andersen 1996).
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II.

Does Latin America Even Have Welfare States?
Despite its continuous efforts to improve the lives of its people, Latin America has only

recently been included in the welfare state literature. For one, democracy has not historically
been consolidated in the region until the end of the 20th century. In addition, several Latin
American countries lack the strong degree of institutionalizing social programs, teeters between
capitalism and socialism within the past and present, and have high market informality and
income disparities. Therefore, it is understandable why scholars are hesitant to apply the concept
of the welfare state to the Latin American context. Yet, it seems inaccurate to discount the
significant improvements in well-being of the Latin American poor when compared to its
previous periods in terms of welfare effort.
Since the beginning of the 21st century, Latin American states have drastically improved
their social policies and protection systems for the poor. Traditionally, the three types of social
policy efforts in Latin America are (1) contributory social insurance, (2) social assistance, and
(3) social services. Contributory social insurance protects against large risks such as
unemployment, sickness, disability, and old age (McGuire 2012). Social policies that increase
human capital include social assistance, or “general revenue-funded cash or other types of
transfers to needy individuals, households, or communities” and the public provision of general
revenue-funded basic social services, such as health care and education (McGuire 2012, 200).
From 1920 to 1980, which is considered the first period of Latin American social policy,
governments expanded social insurance to cover both white-collar and blue-collar workers in the
formal sector (McGuire 2012). Yet, they still provided insufficient social assistance and public
social services to those of lower socioeconomic status living in urban slums or rural areas
(McGuire 2012). From 1980 to 1990, or the second period of Latin American social policy,
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social insurance coverage was decreased due to a series of economic crises (McGuire 2012).
This led to officials reevaluating the necessity of providing social assistance and services to its
people. Yet while contributory social insurance coverage continued to fall in the third period
from 1990 to the present, social protection and basic public social services were significantly
expanded for the poor (McGuire 2012).
In this third period, the most significant innovation has been expansion of coverage to
people in the “informal sector and to people with insufficient histories of contributions to social
insurance schemes” (Huber and Ponce de León 2019). Unlike the previous two periods, a profuse
majority of Latin Americans now had the right to access some type of cash assistance and to
government provided healthcare (Huber and Ponce de León 2019). In 2013, only 28% of the
population in Latin America lived in poverty as compared to 43% at the beginning of the century
(Ocampo and Gómez-Arteaga 2016). Therefore, this paper will primarily focus on the
contemporary Latin American welfare state in terms of the third period.
III.

A Move Away from the Traditional Welfare State
Scholars who study contributory social insurance are mainly concerned with

understanding what these insurances entail, who the recipients of these insurances are, and how
they are able to receive them. This paper is more concerned with the well-being of the Latin
American poor and their equal access to services and assistance since they are the most
vulnerable group in the welfare state. Therefore, focusing on the Latin American welfare state in
the third period of welfare state development requires a move away from the traditional
characteristics of the welfare state, namely its emphasis on the first main type of social policy,
contributory social insurance that corrects for “the failure of private risk markets” (Stiglitz 2018,
12). Contributory social insurance has a history of having a “highly regressive benefit incidence”
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in Latin America (McGuire 2012, 200). When excluding employee and employer contributions,
public spending on social insurance benefited the richest 20% of the population instead of the
lowest 20% of the population “in a ratio of 4:1 in Mexico, 7:1 in Brazil, and 12:1 in Argentina”
(McGuire 2012, 200). This suggests that the policy heavily favors the well-off and poses a large
tax burden, yet yields little benefits to the economically disadvantaged.
Contrary to social insurance, social assistance and social services tend to have a less
regressive benefit incidence. Though they were insufficiently funded and were poorly designed
and implemented in the previous two periods of Latin American welfare state development,
social assistance and services dramatically improved from 2000 onwards. All things considered,
almost every Latin American government operates some type of “means-tested income transfer
program” (Holland and Schneider 2017a, 988). For example, non-contributory policies such as
pensions and conditional cash transfers were expanded to millions of traditionally excluded
families (Holland and Schneider 2017a). Holland and Schneider (2017a, 991) refer to this Latin
American move as the “easy stage of redistribution” in which non-contributory cash transfer
programs (CCTs) and non-contributory pensions (NCPs) are essentially layered “on top of
truncated welfare systems.” In Bolivia, 40.2% of households received cash transfers in 2011
(Holland and Schneider 2017a, 993). Such an easy phase of redistribution seems to have
improved the conditions of the Latin American poor and excluded populations. For example, the
decrease in the poverty rate for all of Latin America between 2000 and 2010 averaged 10.2%
while the Gini coefficient5 also fell five points as the rest of the world faced increases (Holland
and Schneider 2017a). As indicated by the downward regional trend, Figure 2.1 shows that

5

The Gini coefficient as a percentage measures income inequality with a score of 100 meaning perfect inequality
and a score of 0 meaning perfect equality.
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inequality as measured by the Gini Coefficient has decreased for almost all Latin American
countries.
Figure 2.1 Income Inequality in Latin America (1998-2018)

In truth, the contributory social insurance characteristic of the traditional welfare state is
not adapted to the unique experiences of Latin American states as it has significant gaps in
coverage for Latin America’s most vulnerable. Therefore, this paper will primarily discuss the
welfare state in terms of the latter two non-contributory social policies, social assistance and
social services, unless stated otherwise.
IV.

Human Capital Formation in 21st Century Latin American Welfare States
This paper’s focus on the welfare state in the human capital investment perspective hopes

to address this shortcoming that arises when only analyzing the welfare state in terms of
decommodification and stratification. Similar to the work of Huber and Stephens (2005), this
paper will use human capital investment as the defining criteria for the variation in Latin
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American welfare states. The OECD (2001, 7) defines human capital as “the knowledge, skills,
competencies and attributes embodied in individuals that facilitate the creation of personal,
social and economic well-being.” Using a cost-based approach, the United Nations suggests that
human capital investment includes creating the ability “to educate and train individuals,”
“provide them with better health and safety,” and “improve labour allocation via job search and
mobility” (UNECE 2016, 25). Such dimensions of human capital investment are crucial when
considering its role in the 21st century welfare state.
In the 21st century welfare state, a key tenet is “ensuring equality of opportunity” which
depends on human capital investment (Stiglitz 2018, 12). According to Caterina Calsamiglia
(2009, 274), “equality of opportunity requires that an individual’s success in life be independent
of irrelevant characteristics, that is, of characteristics that the individual should not be
responsible for.” This may include an individual’s race, ethnicity, gender, socioeconomic status,
sexual orientation, and so on. Such characteristics should not hinder the individual from
acquiring the skills needed to fully participate in the democratic and capitalistic components of
the welfare state. There is no equality of opportunity as long as immense gaps in wealth and
income exist between such groups. Therefore, a supplemental tenet of the 21st century welfare
state includes “fighting against the intergenerational transmission of advantages and against
discrimination in all of its form” in order to create a just society (Stiglitz 2018, 12). While the
neoliberal state focuses more on the trade-off between efficiency and equity, the 21st century
welfare state realizes its “dual role” to “advance both equity and efficiency” (Leoni 2016).
Therefore, the 21st century welfare state is focused on including previously excluded populations
as a means towards equality and efficiency. This suggests that increasing political and economic
participation may mitigate inequality and poverty to some extent.
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Employment becomes “the best prevention against social risks, which have become more
difficult [for the state] to insure against” (Leoni 2016). This may help equalize market income
(Huber 2015). Such an emphasis on the high long term-returns entails a strong focus on children,
specifically through cultivating their health and education at a young age so they are able to
participate in the labor market (Stiglitz 2018). Stiglitz (2018, 12) therefore characterizes the 21st
century welfare state as “a system of consumer, investor, and worker protection, including a
system trying to increase competitiveness and transparency of markets.”
It is important to note that this paper’s focus on human capital investment does not
advocate for an exclusive move from redistribution to predistribution as an alternative. Yet, it
does recognize the merits of Latin American states reconfiguring how their welfare state
addresses inequality and poverty. Critics of the human capital investment approach typically
argue that the move towards human capital investment tends to inflate its importance, as it fails
to address the deep structural inequalities and poverty. Though this assertion may be true, this
paper chooses to see human capital investment as a supplement to the existing contributory
social protection framework rather than a replacement that increases equal opportunity for
previously excluded populations. This will be explained more fully in the following section.
The goal of this paper is also not to argue which set of social policies are better as both
possess noteworthy qualities, but rather to unearth key determinants of welfare state formation
and variation. It is believed that the interaction between economic and political forces may hold
some insight into why the Latin American welfare state must constantly reinvent itself despite its
progress in lowering poverty and inequality. Therefore, the next section will consider the role of
neo-extractivism in shaping the welfare state.

Ramcharan 23
Chapter III. Neo-extractivism
Neo-Extractivism in a Developmentalist Context
I.

Neo-Extractivism
According to Fitz-Henry and Rodriguez (2020) neo-extractivism is “a term used to refer

to the wave of large-scale natural resource exploitation that has been pursued by progressive
governments throughout the region since the early 2000s.” As opposed to classical extractivism
in which the state followed neo-liberal policies such as privatization and deregulation, Pink Tide
governments ensured “stronger state participation in the regulation and oversight in the
regulation and oversight of extractive projects” (Fitz-Henry and Rodriguez 2020, 91). Their
explicit aims are to secure “higher taxes and royalties” for extractive practices (Fitz-Henry and
Rodriguez 2020, 91). Once they receive these rents, or substantive revenues, Pink Tide
governments and leaders “earmarked for redistribution to the poorest sectors of society via direct
cash transfers or investments in health, infrastructure and education” (Fitz-Henry and Rodriguez
2020, 91). Instead of denouncing the foundation of extraction as a mode of development as
expected from progressive governments, these governments tended to intensify extraction for the
sake of social development.
II.

The Surge of the Pink Tide
From the late 1990s to arguably the present, contemporary Latin American democracies

have experienced the perception of a turn towards widely electing leftist governments in the
region. This was not a surprising feat when considering the debilitating impacts of the debt
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crisis6 and the Washington Consensus 7 on Latin American society. With the fall of the Soviet
Union in 1991 and the fall communism, leftist leaders no longer feared being ousted and killed in
response to U.S. interventions in elections as communism was no longer a credible threat in the
region (Rodriguez 2014). In conjunction with the abandonment of U.S. interventions was the
further strengthening of democracy in the region. Latin America potentially distinguishes itself
from other more authoritarian extractive states in regions like the Persian Gulf, North Africa, and
the Middle East for exactly this reason. According to Burchardt and Dietz (2014, 477), “liberal
democracy has been consolidated for three decades.” As political competition increased and a
dominant state class had not emerged, leftists were broadly welcomed as a legitimate option for
electoral contestation against rightists in the region.
Such a widespread surge of leftist leaders elected in contemporary Latin America became
known as “The Pink Tide.” The term originally arose in an article written by New York Times
journalist Larry Rohter. Noting the less revisionist stances of the new leftist leaders, Rohter
(2005) claimed that the election of Uruguay’s leftist president Tabaré Vázquez and other leftists
in the region ushered in “not so much a red tide as much as a pink tide.” As communism is
normally associated with the color red, the color pink was used instead to describe the
governments of elected leftist leaders in the region who leaned towards socialism. Scholars like
Cleary (2006) and Rodriguez (2014) pinpoint the beginning of the Pink Tide to the 1998 election
of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela. A strong opponent of “savage neoliberalism” at least in speech

The Debt Crisis of the 1980s known as “The Lost Decade,” was marked by hyperinflation and the lowest GDP
growth since the Great Depression (Rodriguez 2014). Scholars have attributed this economic collapse to Latin
America’s previous economic model, import substitution industrialization (ISI). ISI focused on the domestic
expansion of markets to decrease Latin American dependence on developed countries.
7
At the behest of the United States and the IMF, Latin America adopted a series of more conservative neo-liberal
policies like “free trade, privatization, [and] cuts in public spending” known as the Washington Consensus of the
1990s to restructure and repay their debt (Rodriguez 2014).
6
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(Rohter 2005), Chávez wasted no time crafting a new constitution in 1999 which ushered in his
drastic plans for social reform. 8
His presidency would arguably inspire the election of other leftists in the region. Among
the key Pink Tide presidents included the election of Lula da Silva in Brazil, the Kirchners in
Argentina, Evo Morales in Bolivia, and Rafael Correa in Ecuador. Though more moderate than
Chávez, they seemingly shared his disdain for the stagnant economic growth, structural
inequalities, and widespread poverty that continued to plague Latin American society. Figure 3.1
displays a photograph of these leaders at the founding of the Bank of the South in 2007. At the
Pink Tide’s peak in 2009, Luisa Blanco and Robin Grier (2013, 68) note that “fifteen out of
twenty-one Latin American countries” were governed by a Pink Tide leader. This was a huge
contrast considering that “in the 1990s, 64 percent of Latin American presidents were from a
right-wing party” (Blanco and Grier 2013, 68). That number dropped to a mere 33% in 2009
(Blanco and Grier 2013, 68). Thus, democracy appeared to be consolidated in the region.
Figure 3.1 The “Waves” that Made the Pink Tide

These were the Bolivarian Missions, a set of over thirty “social programs created to improve the living conditions
of excluded groups in Venezuela by fighting illiteracy, providing access to education, supplying food at discount
prices, and providing medical services to the poor” (Rodriguez Gallego 2016).
8
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III.

Challenging Pink Tide Rhetoric
One might think that with the election of Pink Tide presidents, the days of low economic

growth and poverty would be remedied. Yet, Rohter (2005) noted vast contradictions in the
objectives and actions of Pink Tide governments that allows one to question just how
groundbreaking this Pink Tide proved to be. As expected, leaders were “sympathetic to the
symbols and rhetoric of the left’s revolutionary past,” were “cosy with Fidel Castro,” and were
“frequently anti-American in their talk.” Yet, “they continue to pursue economic policies that are
favorable to American interests and sensitive to the perceptions of Wall Street” (Rohter 2005).
For example, none of them made any moves to nationalize “foreign-owned companies” as
leaders like communist Fidel Castro in Cuba and socialist Salvador Allende in Chile attempted to
do with agrarian reform laws and U.S. copper interests (Rohter 2005). Though former Pink Tide
President Lula da Silva of Brazil criticized neo-liberal policies, he “followed the same policies of
fiscal restraint and openness to foreign investment” (Rohter 2005). Former Pink Tide President
Rafael Correa of Ecuador had even maintained the dollarization of Ecuador in order to help
Ecuadoreans keep their purchasing power (Rohter 2005). The move towards a reprimarization of
the economy and increased ties with China actually increased dependence on capital, especially
for raw materials (Blanco and Grier 2013). A majority of them did not seem interested in or
capable of changing the fundamentals of capitalism such as encouraging private property rights
or having voluntary markets. Therefore, it is not surprising to see the ebbing of the Pink Tide as
shown in Figure 3.2. Instead, they have seemingly shown their willingness “to play by the
established rules of the game, even if it forces them to abandon cherished ideological goals”
(Rohter 2005). It appears that Pink Tide leaders were not truly the socialists they painted
themselves out to be as they have arguably moved towards capitalism.
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Figure 3.2 The Ebbing of the Pink Tide

IV.

Degrees of Extraction
Scholars Hans-Jürgen Burchardt and Kristina Dietz (2014) identified three consolidated

extractivist strategies in contemporary Latin America. The first pertains to the Andean states that
“traditionally show a very high share of ‘pure’ rents from raw materials” (Burchardt and Dietz
2014, 473). Such states include Ecuador and Venezuela who receive their rents from oil, Peru
and Chile who receive substantial rents from mining, and Bolivia who receives a considerable
portion of rent from gas (Burchardt and Dietz 2014). Andean states will be considered highly
extractive states. With the exceptions of Peru and Paraguay, these states tend to have a majority
of years governed by Pink Tide governments as shown in Figure 3.3.
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In addition, other Latin American countries possess a “more diversified internal
economic structure” (Burchardt and Dietz 2014, 473). This suggests that their extractive sectors
are smaller relative to the Andean countries. However, it is clear that such sectors are becoming
increasingly important. This can be observed in Argentina in the agricultural and mining sectors,
as well as in Brazil with recent discoveries of new oilfields (Burchardt and Dietz 2014).
Colombia seems to follow this pattern as well with oil and coal. Therefore, these countries are
considered as intermediate extractors since more than a half of their exports are still extractive in
nature as evidenced by Figure 3.3. Lastly, Mexico and the Central American states such as El
Salvador and Nicaragua will be considered as low extractive states. Although their emphasis on
extraction is not as apparent as in the Andean and other South American states, Mexico and
Central America have recently shown trends towards that direction (Burchardt and Dietz 2014).
This can be seen in Figure 3.3 in countries such as Honduras, Panama, and Guatemala. Though
they predominantly include non-Pink Tide governments, some like Nicaragua have experienced
Pink Tide governments.
Figure 3.3 Exports of Primary Products by Pink Tide and Non-Pink Tide Governments
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The Unsustainable Welfare State
I.

Social Efforts Under Extractors
As Pink Tide presidents tend to preach more egalitarian discourse when compared to

non-Pink Tide ones, it would make sense for them to be higher extractors with higher welfare
efforts. The more rents and revenue Pink Tide governments gain from extraction, the more
financial resources they would have to fund social welfare programs than non-Pink Tide
governments. Meanwhile, non-Pink Tide governments may tend to follow a more neo-liberal
political and economic model that does not place strong emphasis on building a stable welfare
state. In addition, their degree of extraction may tend to be lower than that of Pink Tide
governments. Nevertheless, as noted in “Chapter II. Latin American Welfare States,” both of
them have made considerable improvements in ensuring the well-being of its people.
Under highly extractive countries with predominantly Pink Tide waves of governments,
they accomplished much in terms of social services and assistance. In terms of healthcare,
Uruguay and Chile both made substantial moves towards universalism. Under Pink Tide
Uruguay, “the state was introduced as the single payer” with “the creation of a unified fund that
covers income and health risks” (Huber 2019, 19). Pink Tide Chile’s partially reformed
healthcare in 2002 marked an important step towards equality as there was “guaranteed treatment
for a specific set of illness” (Huber 2019, 19). In terms of pensions, Pink Tide Bolivia was able
to introduce “a public citizenship pension for anybody over 60 years old” that was not a recipient
“of any social security or other state financed pension” (Huber 2019, 19).
For intermediate extractive countries with both Pink Tide and non-Pink Tide
governments, they also made improvements in human capital formation. In Pink Tide Argentina,
the government was able to make “the pension system public again” by “getting rid of the private
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tier and greatly expanding coverage” (Huber 2019, 19). In terms of healthcare, Non-Pink
Colombia had spent “private and public resources in a comprehensive insurance system” but
made sure to add “some mechanism of solidarity and public cost control” (Fleury 2017, 3).
Concerning conditional cash transfers (CCTs), Pink Tide Brazil’s Bolsa Familia program was
able to serve “84 percent of the Brazilian poor” in 2008 (McGuire 2012, 206). A key area of
progress for CCTs stemmed from the inclusion and empowerment of women into economic life
(Blofield et al. 2017). With women, especially mothers being given access to their own income,
governments were able to pursue their goal of increasing equality of opportunity in terms of
human capital investment.
However, this is not to discount the accomplishments of low extractive countries with
predominantly non-Pink Tide governments. In terms of CCTs, non-Pink Tide Mexico’s
Oportunidades program in 2008 was able to serve “72 percent of the Mexican poor” (McGuire
2012, 206). By instituting conditions for the receipt of funds, evaluations of the programs found
“beneficial effects on income poverty, school attendance and enrollment, nutrition, height for
age, child labor, and the utilization of basic health services” (McGuire 2012, 206). Mexico even
expanded Seguro Popular9 to offer free health services to informal workers (Levy and Schady
2013). By 2010, the program had covered more than 43 million people (Levy and Schady 2013).
In non-Pink Tide Guatemala, providing poor children in their early childhood with a high-protein
energy drink10 “improved chronic malnutrition, schooling, test scores, and men’s wages” (Levy
and Schady 2013, 199). Non-Pink Tide Costa Rica has been known to have one of the highest
welfare efforts in Central America with a unified public healthcare system and significant
investments in education (Huber 2019).

9

Seguro Popular is Mexico’s public health insurance program passed in 2003 (Levy and Schady 2013).
The drink is called Atole and serves as a nutritional supplement for students in school (Levy and Shady 2013).

10
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Ultimately, Pink Tide governments appeared to prioritize “redistribution across class
lines” which allowed them to deliver “better services and transfers and targeted a broader base
than non-left governments” (Huber 2019). Yet, non-Pink Tide government human capital
formation efforts should not go unnoticed. Therefore, it is baffling that “severe inequalities
continue to exist in the quality of services provided” by Latin American countries (Huber 2019).
In terms of social services, Holland and Schneider (2017b) note that upper income groups are
exiting the public-school system and private education and health insurance is rising in the
region. Approximate 40% of the middle class are enrolled in private education (Holland and
Schneider 2017b). This can be attributed to the fact that upper income earners are not interested
in paying taxes as they pay in the “private sector for their families” and then again “for public
services for the poor” (Holland and Schneider 2017b). Therefore, social services are targeted
towards excluded groups such as those with low income or indigenous groups. Yet, they are of
very poor quality with “inadequate facilities” (Levy and Schady 2013, 199). This prevents them
from living up to their full potential in relation to other more affluent groups.
II.

Undoing the Semblance of an Extractive Welfare State
As noted in the previous two sections, both Pink Tide and non-Pink Tide states appeared

to have made substantial reductions in poverty throughout the 21st century using natural resource
rents. Yet, the development of new welfare programs aimed at increasing human capital
investment onto the traditional redistribution mechanisms has failed to address the stagnant
societal structure that continues to remain in the Latin American society. Christened as “the
elevator effect” by Burchardt and Dietz (2014, 475), this term alludes to the fact that “almost all
social groups are moving up, but the structural composition of society remains the same.”11

While this can be attributed to former President John F. Kennedy’s “A rising tide lifts all boats,” the tide seems to
lift “super yachts” instead, as stated by New Zealand Labour MP David Parker. Gene Sperling, the former economic
11
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While the extra income gained from extractive practices have been nationalized and used
towards new anti-poverty programs, economic elites have still retained their power and wealth
(Burchardt and Dietz 2014). In Latin American countries, there are little to no “tax reforms
targeting wealthy asset-owners and land reforms establishing more egalitarian access to land”
(Burchardt and Dietz 2014, 475). While the incomes of the poor have improved, its magnitude is
negligible when compared to the rich who have seen a larger increase in incomes as Figure 3.4
illustrates.
The middle classes seem to be profiting the most from the neo-extractivism process while
the rich gain more of the “spoils” from extraction. While the poor are better off than they once
were, they are still relatively worse off as the rich benefit the most from excess profits. Not to
mention that only 10% of transfer payments actually reach “the poorest fifth of the population”
(Burchardt and Dietz 2014, 474). The rest went to “formally employed people with social
security and thus higher incomes” (Burchardt and Dietz 2014, 474). Such a skewed distribution
of profits from extractivism between economic elites and the lower classes warrant concern,
especially as it undermines the equality of opportunity aspect of human capital investment.

advisor to Bill Clinton said that other boats “will run aground.” Economic growth, in this case through extractivism,
tends to not benefit all people equally.
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Figure 3.4 Poverty in Latin America

In addition to an inefficient allocation of profits from natural resources, an informal
labor market is a source of one of the biggest market failures Pink Tide and non-Pink Tide
welfare states must attempt to remedy if they hope to increase human capital investment. It
should be noted that the labor market is already assumed to be Pareto inefficient in a welfare
state. All gains from trade are not exhausted since there are people willing to supply their labor
but few who demand it. Everyone acting in their best interest does not create a well-off society
in terms of human capital formation because people stay in the more profitable informal market
with no access to substantive social protection. Firms do not formalize employment to create
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contributory social protection schemes due to cost. Resources do not go to their highest valued
use because they are misallocated and skewed towards the profit maximization interests of
extractive industries. Economic growth is not maximized since the labor force is not being used
to its fullest extent. In the long run, this hurts the state’s interest in collecting tax revenues to
fund human capital. Holland and Schneider (2017a, 994) note that the recent move towards noncontributory social assistance programs has the ability to increase informal employment. While
there is only preliminary empirical evidence of this phenomenon, most of the literature has
supported this idea. In their review of several studies detailing the effects of noncontributory
programs on labor market formality, Levy and Schady (2013, 204) find that “noncontributory
social insurance programs function as a subsidy to informal employment because informal
workers receive at least some of the same benefits as formal workers.” Yet a key difference
stems in the fact that informal workers do not pay for these benefits “from foregone wages”
(Levy and Schady 2013, 204). The generosity of such non-contributory programs actually seems
to have negative implications for labor market formality. In Uruguay for example, Holland and
Schneider (2017a, 995) note that “the CCT program adopted in 2008 is associated with an 11%
decrease in formal employment.” While not a large decrease, this still undermines the role of the
welfare state in correcting labor market informality.
Though countries with Pink Tide and non-Pink Tide governments already maintain low
tax burdens due to the vast revenue gained from extractivism, attempts towards formalizing labor
markets must be made to generate a greater fiscal taxing capacity for these governments. After
all, it seems counterintuitive for Pink Tide and non-Pink Tide governments to invest so much in
human capital if there are little to no equal or employment opportunities or revenues generated,
as well as other low returns on investment.
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Therefore, while numerous studies have focused solely on the state’s role in providing
social welfare for its people, this paper primarily hopes to explore the mechanisms in which
extractive industries indirectly affect the creation of the welfare state. In the next section of this
paper, two key mechanisms, namely the extractive firm’s stronger influence on the state’s
redistributive power and its inability to help the state fix labor market failure are identified in
relation to human capital investment.
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Chapter IV. The Gilded Welfare State
Influencing the State’s Redistributive Power
I.

Inequality of Opportunity
The elevator effect exacerbated by neo-extractivism breeds inequality of opportunity

through the extractive firms' use of influence on the state’s decentralized decision making. As
mentioned in “Chapter II. Latin American Welfare States,” decentralized decision making is
integral to the human capital investment foundation of the welfare state as it allows all levels of
government to have equal influence in deciding how to redistribute the gains from extraction.
Unfortunately, this component of the welfare state is not compatible in the typical neo-extractive
state. Due to the more pronounced ties between the state and its extractive firms as detailed in
“Chapter III. Neo-Extractivism,” decision making is more centralized with less input from the
local communities where extraction takes place. As these places tend to be remote, there is far
more influence from the extractive industries. Therefore, neo-extractive states exert a nonchalant
attitude towards oil or mining, instead opting to administer “the responsibility for addressing
social demands” onto extractive industries (Acosta 2013, 68). Yet by allowing extractive
industries to influence their redistributive power, both Pink and non-Pink Tide governments
undermine any move towards greater human capital investment by curating clientelism and
coercing complacency.
II.

Curation of Clientelism
According to McGuire (2012, 426), clientelism is the “the personal delivery, via a

somewhat stable political network that extends from the politician to the voter, of divisible,
excludable goods in exchange for votes or other kinds of political support.” While it has always
been a problem throughout Latin American history through “the proffering of pork, state
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patronage jobs'' or possibly in the case of Pink Tide and non-Pink Tide governments, “cash
assistance in exchange for votes,” clientelism becomes even more pronounced in the backdrop of
neo-extractivism (McGuire 2012, 103). Governments, especially Pink Tide ones, often seek the
support of extractive firms to finance human capital. Yet, these firms typically manipulate the
political and economic landscape to work in their favor. In the context of rent-seeking, or the
“pursuit of excess profits above market payoff that the government can create through legislation
and regulation,” extractive firms enjoy a variety of privileges with no repercussions from the
state due to its reliance on extraction (Halbac 2020b). Unfortunately, these privileges in the form
of political rents result in social waste as extractive firms distort resource allocation with their
influence on the state.
Extractive firms are fully aware of their great importance in human capital development
relative to other industries in the region as they are central drivers of economic growth. They
often use it as leverage when negotiating with Pink Tide and non-Pink Tide governments. For
example, the extractive industries’ interest in maximizing profits for the short term runs counter
to the state’s interest in gaining the most money for human capital formation. Gudynas (2010, 5)
reports that the mining industry in Brazil “enjoys exemptions from taxes” as “they [do not] pay
the Circulation Tax on Merchandise.” Any “royalties and stocks of the Financial Contribution for
Mining Exploration” that “go to municipalities are low” at about “1% to 3% of the liquid
revenues” (Gudynas 2010, 5). The companies within the sector even make the calculations
themselves (Gudynas 2010, 5). Often, natural resource rents are diverted from the typical Latin
American welfare state into other countries which tend to be “tax havens” (Acosta 2013, 67). In
Chile for example, profits from natural resource extraction that were sent out of the country by
foreign businesses totaled “more than 25 billion dollars” (Gudynas 2010, 5). Due to its weak
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capacity to enforce or monitor extractive practices or to ensure that natural resource rents are
used domestically to improve human capital investment, Pink and non-Pink governments are
unable to gain the full extent of spoils from extraction. Such a diversion of funds not only
eliminates the potential for their allocation towards enhancing equal opportunity, but also
consolidates an unstrategic and unbalanced partnership between the welfare state and its
extractive industries.
Yet in the case of state-owned enterprises, the interests of governments and the extractive
industry are seemingly one and the same. PetroEcuador, the 100% state-owned oil company of
Ecuador, had signed a contract with PetroChina to sell 90% of its oil production until 2020
(Garcia 2009). Former Pink Tide Finance Minister Patricio Rivera had said that China provided
the financing for Ecuador and in exchange, Ecuador would sell its oil to them at international
prices (Schneyer and Perez 2013). This does not appear to be anything of concern, until one
considers that Ecuador was “shunned by most lenders since a $3.2 billion debt default in 2008”
(Schneyer and Perez 2013). Having lost credibility on the international level, Ecuador had no
choice but to give China almost exclusive rights and monopoly control of its oil. In return, China
provided a $1 billion credit line at a very high interest rate of 7.25 percent to be repaid in two
years (Schneyer and Perez 2013). Not only had Petroecuador given China the rights to its oil
worth $13 billion, which was highly above what they could have received for it, but they
prevented other buyers from purchasing it (Schneyer and Perez 2013). Such crowding out12 of
private investments diverted a $12 billion profit that could have been directed towards building
the welfare state. This did not work to maximize profits for the state-owned enterprise’s interests.
Ecuador’s extractive industry reliance prevented it from renegotiating and securing more money

The “crowding out effect” suggests that increasing government public spending may end up decreasing private
sector spending.
12
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for human capital formation. Meanwhile, PetroEcuador is unconcerned with maximizing profit
since the state will provide it with the subsidies necessary to keep it operational. Ultimately, this
pure wealth transfer from Ecuador to China without China assuming more responsibility was an
unproductive use of resources and detrimental for human capital investment as there were less
funds to allocate towards this end.
III.

Coercion for Political Complacency
In such clientelistic partnerships, “resources distributed go to the most politically useful

recipients” and not to its best use (McGuire 2012, 426). Yet, there are cases where extractive
firms attempt to increase their human capital investment into less politically useful and excluded
groups of society. In Bolivia for example, Newmont Mining Corporation, the majority owner of
the Inti Raymi mine, had “created 700 jobs for Bolivian citizens,” paid “$8.2 million per year in
salaries and benefits,” and spent “$18 million annually on local goods and services” (Gutierrez
2007, 165). In addition, the company trained and educated its employees, as well as provided
“full access to medical care for its employees” (Gutierrez 2007, 165). Such an expansion of
equal opportunity within these communities appears to be commendable. Before the mining
company arrived in the city of Oruro in the early 1990s, more than 70 percent of families lived in
poverty and 84 percent did not have access to potable water” (Gutierrez 2007, 165). Therefore,
it is unfortunate that any gains to the local population in accessing health, education, and other
public services were unsustainable in the long run.
Locals such as the Quechua, Aymara, and Uru indigenous communities who practice
subsistence farming and live near downstream from the Inti Raymi’s Kori Kollo gold mine now
lack access to safe drinking water (Albuquerque 2014, 1). Ironically, indigenous communities
had rightfully “filed over 900 official complaints'' over the fatal effects of the mine throughout its
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duration of operation (Albuquerque 2014, 1). Yet concerns fell on deaf ears. It was only until
2012 that the Bolivian government’s audit of the mine revealed the true impact of the Kori Kollo
mine — “acid mine drainage; severe salinization of groundwater and soils; contamination of
groundwater with cyanide, cadmium, zinc and copper beyond levels allowed in Bolivia” and
“violations of several water quality laws” (Albuquerque 2014, 2). Environmental and economic
damages were estimated to be $4 million (Albuquerque 2014, 2). By then, Newmont Mining
Corporation had already sold the mine in 2009 and was still collecting royalties from it until the
mine was finally shut down in 2015 (Albuquerque 2014, 2). Any employment generated was lost
with the closure of the mine. This implies that any human capital investments from extractive
firms are not only as short-lived as the mine itself, but meant to temporarily encourage
cooperation from local communities and validate extractivist practices. As part of their influence
on the state’s redistribution power, it is easy for the extractive industry to avoid responsibility
and compensation for the negative externalities generated for their operations at the Kori Kollo
mine, for example. As such, the management of redistribution becomes disorganized and
ineffective as they face little to no repercussions not only from the indifferent attitude of the
complacent weak state but the newly complacent excluded groups created.
While extractive firms may allocate funds towards the empowerment of marginalized
communities as shown in Bolivia, “benefits'' from extractive industries not only fail to accrue no
substantive benefits to the welfare state but may come at the expense of community selfdetermination. As these communities where extraction often lack access to many opportunities
for quality education, healthcare, and employment, these groups have no choice but to accept the
residualisitc extractive-based welfare state and remain complacent. If they do decide to mobilize,
dissent, or vote as the indigenous communities did in this case, they risk losing whatever
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minimal benefits they receive from extractive firms since they initially had none. In addition,
these groups face repression from the extractive industry itself, sometimes backed by the state. In
the case of the Kori Kollo mine, the state’s audit “provided no information to affected
communities on when or how the mine site will be appropriately closed and restored, whether the
pollution will be mitigated, or whether the impacted communities will be compensated for their
loss of freshwater, among other harms” (Albuquerque 2014, 2). Damage to the land and wellbeing is already done with no likelihood of remediation from the state or extractive firms. Such a
feat further disempowers excluded communities and prevents them from realizing their full
potential in the human capital centered welfare state, such as pressuring the government to
provide more long-term equal opportunities, social services, or social assistance.
Failing to Correct a Market Failure
I.

High Labor Market Informality
Perhaps the most important source of inequality and poverty today stems from high labor

market informality. According to the International Labor Organization, about 56 million of Latin
American youth from the ages of 15 to 24 are in the workforce (ILO). While 7 million of these
youths are unemployed, 27 million of them work in the informal market (ILO). As mentioned in
“Chapter II. Latin American Welfare States,” a key component of the welfare state involves the
role of the state in fixing market failures. Labor market informality is a market failure since the
government is unable to generate tax revenues to fund human capital formation. This deepens its
reliance on extractive industries for rents. Neo-extractivism does little to nothing in alleviating
the informality of labor markets because of its weak capacity to create formal employment
within Latin American society. Such a feat is detrimental when one considers the value of
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formal employment for human capital investment in terms of employment generation and
collective bargaining.
II.

The Low Skill Trap
The business preferences of firms in Latin America are different from European firms. As

opposed to their European counterparts, Latin American firms generally do not view
employment and social policy legislation favorably (McGuire 2012, 277). Due to their highly
skilled labor force and coordinated efforts to mobilize, European firms may be more willing to
invest in human capital to generate the specific skills needed for optimal firm performance.
Therefore, they might not have general problems with pressuring the government for labor or
education reform. This is a sharp contrast to Latin American firms who do not rely much on
formal labor and therefore, may not see incentives to develop human capital in the short or long
term. This generates what McGuire (2012, 277) refers to as the “low skill trap, where firms do
not create high-skill jobs because they cannot find skilled workers, and workers do not invest in
skill acquisition because they cannot find high skill jobs.” Consistent with rent-seeking practices,
any strict labor regulations are also circumvented in an effort to maintain excess profits,
especially in the extractive industry. Extractive firms are guiltier of this than other firms as they
further foster Pareto inefficiency.
According to Acosta (2013, 67), neo-extractive economies are enclaves in that they “are
usually isolated from the rest of the economy.” As opposed to the telecommunications industry
for example, extractive firms “do not generate employment on a large scale,” despite being large
scale operations (Acosta 2013, 68). For example, only “0.5 to 2 jobs are directly created” in the
case of large-scale mining for every $1 million invested (Svampa 2014). These industries not
only generate little direct employment, but also generate little indirect employment as well.
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Acosta (2013, 68) states that extractivist firms “are capital and import-intensive industries.” Any
“inputs and technology they use are almost exclusively imported” (Acosta 2013, 68). Due to
automation, these industries do not depend too much on labor, especially low skilled unless it
pertains to local mining or agriculture in which they hire informal labor. When these extractive
industries do require labor, “they hire skilled workers and managers” who often come from
foreign countries as opposed to domestic ones who likely do not have opportunity to obtain the
required skill sets (Acosta 2013, 68).
Perhaps an even more daunting fact from the input process is that countries whose
extractive firms play such a large role in redistribution do not integrate “primary export activities
with the rest of the economy” (Acosta 2013, 65). This is due to the fact that these industries are
typically based in “highly productive production,” while the other sectors of the economy may
be “backward and subsistence-based” (Acosta 2013, 65). For example, domestic sectors are
unable to provide the sophisticated machinery or other inputs needed for oil drilling so extractive
firms must import them. In addition, extractive firms do not usually process these resources as
they lack refining capacity (Acosta 2013, 65). Therefore, it is not surprising to see that Ecuador
“imported approximately 122,000 b/d of petroleum products in 2016,” despite the fact that it is
“the fifth-largest oil producer in South America” (Country Analysis Brief: Ecuador 2017). This
not only lowers any oil revenue received by Ecuador but also implies that any profits cannot be
allocated towards developing the domestic capital needed for the purposes of human capital
investment. Instead, extractive firms are encouraged to extract more to sell on the world market
to make up for lost profits.
An absence of available incentives to create formalized employment opportunities stifles
any attempts at creating human capital investment opportunities within the extractive sector itself
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or other sectors. Latin American welfare states already experience labor market failure with
widespread labor market informality. Yet, neo-extractivism only worsens the existing market
failure by making little to no attempts in using the available labor force to its full extent. Such a
move is demeaning for the Latin American welfare state whose central functions include fixing
markets failures.
III.

Subversion of Collective Bargaining
In the cases where extraction is able to generate formal jobs with adequate social services

like healthcare and contributory pensions, collective bargaining is often met with much
resistance and little tolerance for dissent from the firm, especially in non-Pink Tide governments.
While Pink Tide governments prefer the usage of state-owned extractive companies, non-Pink
Tide governments prefer privatized ones. Non-Pink Tide Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro
favors the privatization of Brazil’s state-owned oil company Petrobras, eventually selling the
Landulpho Alves Refinery (RLAM) in 2021 (Industriall 2021). Unfortunately, this contributed to
the causes of “a 30-day strike” initiated by the Brazilian oil workers’ union FUP as the refinery
“was sold for less than the minimum amount set by Petrobras” (Industriall 2021). Consistent
with the rent-seeking practices mentioned earlier, this “resulted in large payments and bonuses
for the company senior management” which raised doubts about the transparency of the sale
(Industriall 2021). Instead of redistributing the money gained from the sale towards workers or
perhaps investing in new training programs, extractive management opted for layoffs and
pocketed the money themselves.
This “drastic reduction of the workforce” ultimately “led to employees being
overworked” and “increased the risk of accidents” (Industriall 2021). Workers are not also not
allowed to use their face masks to protect themselves against Covid-19 if it has the union logo or
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slogan denouncing privatization (Industriall 2021). Such actions result in union punishments like
imposed fines. This not only implies the firm’s little regard for the worker’s health and safety,
but also undermines the negotiated collective agreement. For example, the Landulpho Alves
Refinery “suspended FUP leader Deyvid Bacelar for 29 days for leading the strike and is
preparing to dismiss him” (Industriall 2021). Such intimidation tactics were performed “to
dissuade other workers from taking action to protect their rights and their jobs” (Industriall
2021). Through repressive actions like this, the extractive firm stifles the power of the union and
prevents its workers from actively participating in the economic aspect of the welfare state. For
example, the union believes “the actions by Petrobras management are violating ILO
Conventions 9813 and 13514, both ratified by Brazil” (Industriall 2021). This insinuates that basic
union rights are being undermined in a welfare state created to further human capital investment.
Overall, extractive firms are uninterested “in fostering stable employment patterns or cooperative relationships with labor on the shop floor” (McGuire 2012, 277). A reason for this may
be the fact that employees are replaceable. Extractive firms know there is a large informal labor
pool who would work for less than minimum wage if given the opportunity, with little to no
complaints of the dangerous working conditions. As extractive firms are aware of their economic
power, they face little pressure from the state who may depend on them to help provide
employment for people. Any incentives for investments into the longevity of workers is
therefore ignored. Attempts of workers to contest the practices of extractivist firms fall on deaf
ears similar to community complaints of extractive practices as mentioned earlier. This may
discourage workers from exercising their economic rights as they know the enforcement of union
contracts will not protect them from being fired. Ultimately, extractive firms do not cultivate an
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The right to organize and collectively bargain (ILO)
The right of union representatives to be protected from dismissal (ILO)
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environment conducive for effective economic participation by divesting any human capital
investments and ignoring the will of workers. This makes it difficult for workers to act against
repressive extractivist firm practices which contributes to a lack of human capital investment in
the Latin American welfare state.
The Unstable Gilded Welfare State
I.

The Erosion of the Latin American Welfare States
The term “gilded welfare state” was created to emphasize the predicted outcome of the

interaction between neo-extractivism and the formation of Latin American welfare states in
terms of human capital. There is no doubt that there have been improvements in the welfare state
as evidenced by socioeconomic indicators and the widespread expansion of social programs. As
explained in this paper so far, increasing equitable redistribution and fixing market failures are
the core democratic and capitalistic foundations of the welfare state. In the 21st century Latin
American welfare state based on human capital investment, inequality of opportunity and
informal labor markets are the main sources of deep inequalities that continue to exist. Such
problems are further exacerbated by the two mechanisms of neo-extractivism that hinder human
capital formation – its large influence on the state’s redistributive power and its inability to
create formal employment. Since the basic foundation of the Latin American welfare state
appears to be undermined by neo-extractivism, it is unfitting to refer to them as true welfare
states without acknowledgement of this finding. This concept is summarized in Figure 4.1.
Therefore, while the literature seems to suggest a positive relationship between neoextractivism and human capital formation, this paper expects a negative association between the
two variables. By establishing the mechanisms extractive industries use to indirectly impact
human capital formation, this negative association should be stronger for Pink Tide governments
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as opposed to non-Pink Tide governments since Pink Tide governments tend to extract more for
the sake of human capital formation and their egalitarian discourse. All that glitters may not be
gold, especially in the case of Latin American welfare states. By failing to properly incorporate
vulnerable populations into political and economic life, both Pink and non-Pink Tide
governments dependent on neo-extractivism risk undermining the very welfare state they hope to
build.
Figure 4.1 The Gilded Welfare State

The next section of this paper aims to empirically assess this assertion by establishing a
more direct linkage between neo-extractivism and the Latin American gilded welfare state using
a simple quantitative OLS regression model.
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Chapter V. Medium-N First-Differenced Model
Primary Determinants of the Gilded Welfare State
I.

Pink Tide
Since this is the first paper that attempts to quantify the Pink Tide, no previous

operationalizations were available to use as a measure for this variable. While there are datasets
measuring the legislative and executive ideology for Latin American countries, the missingness
of many recent observations seems unconducive for analysis. Therefore, I used Blofield, Ewig,
and Piscopo’s (2017) typology of Left governments in Latin America to create a Pink Tide
dummy variable. For each year during 1998 to 2018 in which a state is under the presidency of a
leftist president, it is coded as “Pink Tide” with a value of 1. For each year during 1998 to 2018
in which a state is not under the presidency of a leftist president, it is coded as “Not Pink” with a
value of 0. Therefore, the Pink Tide variable reflects the leftist presidents’ position during the
period of their government instead of the ideology that was adopted at the time of the
presidential elections (Blofield et al. 2017). The value of the Pink Tide wave variable does not
change once a president’s term is completed and another president with the same ideology
assumes power immediately after.
This measure, while not arbitrary, may be susceptible to human error. Unlike variables
with continuous data, this categorical variable is subjective in the sense that one’s classification
of a Pink Tide president may be different from another’s classification of the same president. The
time period begins in 1998 when Hugo Chávez was elected president of Venezuela as he is
widely considered as the first Pink Tide president in the literature. In addition, this paper will
assume that the Pink Tide has not ended. Following the election of various rightist leaders in
countries formerly exhibiting Pink Tide waves such as the 2015 election of Mauricio Macri in
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Argentina and the 2016 appointment of Michel Temer in Brazil, it appears that the Pink Tide had
officially ended in the mid-2010s. However, the election of leftist leaders in Bolivia, Argentina,
and Mexico in the late 2010s and early 2020s suggests a resurgence of leftist leaders in the
region. Particularly notable was the 2018 election of Andrés Manuel López Obrador in Mexico, a
country which did not experience a Pink Tide wave within the twenty-year time period this paper
will focus on. Therefore, this paper will assume the Pink Tide did not truly end.
II.

Extractive Industry Reliance
Neo-extractivism is measured by extractive industry reliance. This is operationalized

using the total natural resource rents as a percentage of GDP. This includes the sum of oil rents,
natural gas rents, hard and soft coal rents, mineral rents, and forest rents (Total Natural Resource
Rents). Figure 5.1 illustrates the total natural resource rents for each Latin American country.
There appears to be much more variation in the changes of extraction for Pink Tide waves than
in non-Pink Tide governments, especially in Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, and Venezuela. With the
exceptions of Colombia, Peru, and perhaps Mexico, the remaining non-Pink Tide waves have
natural resource rents that are closer to 0% of their GDP. Nevertheless, the average natural
resource rents between 1998 and 2018 for Latin American countries is 4.67%. As indicated by
Figure 5.2, Pink Tide waves in each country averaged 7.42% for resource rents, about 2.75
percentage points above average. On the other hand, non-Pink Tide waves in each country
averaged 3.15% for resource rents, 1.52 percentage points below the overall average and 4.27
percentage points below the average of countries with Pink Tide waves. Overall, it seems that
countries with Pink Tide waves appear to have higher resource rents than countries with nonPink Tide waves.
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Figure 5.1 Total Natural Resource Rents in Contemporary Latin America

Figure 5.2 Average Natural Resource Rents in Contemporary Latin America
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Measuring the Gilded Welfare State
I.

Human Capital Investment
Human capital investment is measured in terms of social services and social assistance.

For the purposes of this paper, social services and social assistance will be operationalized using
the expenditure approach based on variables found on the United Nations Economic Commission
for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), or in Spanish, the CEPALSTAT website. A
central argument of Esping-Andersen (1990) involves his assertion that analyses of the welfare
state should not focus too much on expenditures since it fails to capture the welfare state in its
entirety. Instead, political economists should be more concerned with “how it is spent” as
opposed to “how much is spent” (Filgueira 2005, 12).
While this is a valid argument as it considers multiple dimensions of the welfare state
instead of one, the expenditure approach is justifiable in the case of Latin America. For one, the
levels of spending as a percentage of GDP are still relatively low and stagnant when compared to
other developing states (Filgueira 2005). In addition, Latin American states still show
substantial variation in the amount of spending when compared to one another. For example,
Venezuelan social spending in terms of education, health, and social protection was 18.8% of its
GDP as compared to Panamanian social spending which was 8.2% in the same year of 2014.
Though not without its flaws, expenditures are at least capable of showing the government’s
commitment to human capital investment since it serves as an indicator of how valuable the
government perceives human capital expenditure measures relative to the other areas of public
investment. Therefore, it seems incomplete to consider other more sophisticated measurements
of the welfare state such as the infant mortality rate or the literacy rate without focusing first on
the basic criteria of human capital investment— the money.
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1. Social Services: This will be measured in terms of the central government’s current health and
education expenditure as a percentage of its GDP. Health expenditure in this context consists of
the general government expenditure on health and private expenditure on health (Health). This
includes the sum of all funds for health maintenance, restoration, and enhancement that was
“paid for in cash or supplied in kind” (Health). Figure 5.3 illustrates the yearly health
expenditures for each Latin American country. The average health expenditure between 2000
and 2018 for all 18 Latin American countries was 6.82%. As illustrated by Figure 5.4, Pink Tide
waves in each country averaged 7.40% for health expenditures, about 0.58 percentage points
above average. On the other hand, non-Pink Tide waves in each country averaged 6.45% for
health expenditures, 0.37 percentage points below the overall average and almost 1 percentage
point below the average of countries with Pink Tide waves. Overall, it seems that countries with
Pink Tide waves appear to have higher health expenditures than countries with non-Pink Tide
waves.
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Figure 5.3 Total Health Expenditure in Contemporary Latin America

Figure 5.4 Average Health Expenditure in Contemporary Latin America
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On the other hand, education expenditure consists of the “current and capital
expenditures on education by local, regional, and national governments, including
municipalities” (Education). According to the ECLAC’s description of the education variable,
any household contributions to education were excluded from the dataset and “expenses incurred
by all ministries and levels of administration related to education” should have been included in
the dataset (Education). Figure 5.5 displays the yearly education expenditure for each Latin
American country for which there is data available. With the exception of Bolivia, the average
education expenditure between 1998 and 2018 for Latin American countries was 4.15%. As
indicated by Figure 5.6, Pink Tide waves in each country averaged 4.36% for health
expenditures, about 0.21 percentage points above average. On the other hand, non-Pink Tide
waves in each country averaged 4.05% for health expenditures, 0.10 percentage points below the
overall average and 0.31 percentage points below the average of countries with Pink Tide waves.
Overall, it seems that countries with Pink Tide waves appear to have higher education
expenditures than countries with non-Pink Tide waves.
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Figure 5.5 Total Education Expenditure in Contemporary Latin America

Figure 5.6 Average Education Expenditure in Contemporary Latin America
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2. Social Assistance: This is measured by the central government’s social expenditure as a
percentage of its GDP in terms of health, education, and social protection. Though health and
education are already included in social services as their own section of the mandatory budgets,
these expenditures have a different function as a subsidiary of total social spending that in turn,
supplement their expenditures as part of social services. For example, health expenditure in this
case refers to the “disbursements for health services provided to individuals and groups''
(Indicators). Meanwhile, education expenditure includes the “disbursements at different levels of
education, from pre-school to tertiary,” in addition to “ancillary services and research and
development related to education” (Indicators). Social protection expenditure consists of
“disbursements for services and transfers to individuals and families'' that safeguard against risks
faced by the entire population such as illness and unemployment (Indicators). Yet, the measure
also covers against the risks that are associated with social exclusion such as inequality by
including conditional cash transfers (CCTs). Figure 5.7 illustrates the yearly social expenditures
for each Latin America country for which there is data available. With the exception of Peru, the
average social expenditure between 1998 and 2018 for Latin American countries was 10.00%.
As indicated by Figure 5.6, Pink Tide waves in each country averaged 11.44% for social
expenditures, about 1.44 percentage points above average. On the other hand, non-Pink Tide
waves in each country averaged 9.08% for social expenditures, 0.92 percentage points below the
overall average and 2.36 percentage points below the average of countries with Pink Tide waves.
Overall, it seems that countries with Pink Tide waves appear to have higher social expenditures
than countries with non-Pink Tide waves.
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Figure 5.7 Total Social Expenditure in Contemporary Latin America

Figure 5.8 Average Social Expenditure in Contemporary Latin America
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Pink and Non-Pink Tide Wave Differences
I.

Justification of First-Differenced OLS Regression
The first-differenced OLS regression of 33 observations considers the natural resource

rents and expenditures for 1615 Latin American countries for each Pink Tide and non-Pink Tide
wave. The goal is to understand if there is a difference between Pink Tide and non-Pink Tide
regarding changes in extractive industry reliance and human capital investment. The independent
variable of extractive industry reliance was operationalized by the percentage change in natural
resource rents from the beginning of each Pink Tide or non-Pink Tide wave of government to the
end of each Pink Tide or non-Pink Tide wave of government. Similarly, the dependent variable
of human capital investment was operationalized by the percentage change in expenditure from
the beginning of each Pink Tide or non-Pink Tide wave of government to the end of each Pink
Tide or non-Pink Tide wave of government. A first-differenced OLS regression analysis was
performed and displayed in scatter plots with 95% confidence interval bands. Both
measurements were calculated from percentages to dollar amounts based on the GDP at
purchasing power parity (PPP) in current international dollars.
Consistent with the literature and hypothesis, there should be an increase in the
percentage of natural resource rents for both Pink Tide and non-Pink Tide waves since neoextractivism seems to be a dominant economic and development model for the Latin American
region. According to the literature, this increase should be associated with increases in the
percentages of human capital expenditures for both Pink Tide and non-Pink Tide waves since
more rents should finance more investments. The hypothesis on the other hand suggests that an

15

The Dominican Republic and Peru are excluded from both spending regressions. There was no data available for
Peru regarding social expenditure and the Dominican Republic was an outlier in the analysis. Both Peru and the
Dominican Republic were outliers for health expenditure and were excluded.
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increase in the natural resource rents should be associated with decreases in the percentages of
human capital expenditures. This is due to the mechanisms that were discussed in “Chapter IV.
The Gilded Welfare State.” Consistent with both the literature and hypothesis, the magnitude of
such increases or decreases in expenditures and rents should be larger for Pink Tide waves. This
is due to an expected greater commitment from Pink Tide governments towards promoting equal
opportunity through higher human capital investments but also the fact that they tend to be the
highest extractors in the Latin America region as stated in “Chapter II. Neo-Extractivism.”
While regressions were completed for health and social expenditures, it was not
completed for education expenditures. Due to the high amount of missing data points for the start
and end of each Pink or no Pink Tide wave, any results from a graph would probably not be
representative of the entire sample. The number of observations is too small. Nevertheless, it is
assumed that any percent changes in education expenditure and natural resource rents would
be similar to that of the graph for health expenditure due to both of them being social
services. They are also both funded by a combination of public and private provisions (Huber et
al. 2008).
II.

Natural Resource Rents and Health Spending
The results for both Pink Tide and non-Pink Tide waves are shown in Figure 5.9. It seems

that for a 1% percent increase in natural resource rents, there will be a 0.46% increase in health
expenditure. This is consistent with the literature. Based on the Pearson correlation of 0.48, there
seems to be a moderately positive association between the two variables. Its intercept suggests
that even if Latin American countries are not extracting, they will still have about a 50% increase
in social spending.
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Figure 5.9 Percentage Change in Natural Resource Rents and Health Spending

Figure 5.10 Percentage Change in Natural Resource Rents and Health Spending by Wave
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The disaggregated results of Pink Tide and non-Pink Tide waves are shown in Figure
5.10. Interestingly enough, there is almost no association 16 between natural resource rents and
the health spending for Pink Tide waves. For each 1% increase in natural resource rents, there
will be a 0.04% increase in health expenditure. This supports the idea of natural resource rents
not being used efficiently. Yet, there are other possible reasons for this, the most important being
that Pink Tide governments are already spending a high amount on health so their rents are spent
in other areas of human investment that were not accounted for like minimum wage or
environmental protections. This may be more ideologically motivated than fiscally since Pink
Tide governments may continue to spend at high levels, even if they have little resources
available to them. For example, they may see health spending as necessary and may invest the
same amount regardless of extraction.
Perhaps most surprising is that non-Pink Tide governments behaved more like what was
expected of Pink Tide governments. For each 1% increase in natural resource rents, there will be
a 0.86% increase in health expenditure. Based on the Pearson correlation of 0.72, there seems to
be a strong positive association between the two variables. Perhaps this can be attributed to the
fact that these governments are neo-liberal in nature and may not emphasize equity as much as
efficiency. Perhaps they do not see the merit in enhancing equity through more human capital
investments as a way to also increase efficiency so resources are allocated more Pareto
efficiently than in a welfare state. In addition, it should be noted that most of these governments
are low extractors so they may not have the money needed to increase health expenditure. This is
further supported by the fact that Mexico, Columbia, and some Central American countries like
Panama, Nicaragua, and Honduras seem to be in a somewhat straight line. This suggests that as

16

The Pearson Correlation coefficient is 0.07.
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long as non-Pink Tide governments can finance social programs with natural resource rents, they
will do so but when they cannot, they will not increase health expenditures. In addition, its
intercept of 4.83%, is lower than the 99.77% intercept of the Pink Tide graph. This implies that
even when the percentage change in resource rents is 0%, or there is no extraction, Pink Tide
governments will still spend more on health than non-Pink Tide governments.
III.

Natural Resource Rents and Social Spending
The results for both Pink Tide and non-Pink Tide waves are shown in Figure 5.11 and are

quite similar to the health expenditure graphs. It seems that for each 1% increase in natural
resource rents, there will be a 0.31% increase in social expenditure. Based on the Pearson
correlation of 0.38, there seems to be a somewhat weak positive association between the two
percent changes. Its intercept suggests that even if Latin American countries are not extracting,
they will still have about a 100% increase in social spending from other sectors of the economy.
Figure 5.11 Percentage Change in Natural Resource Rents and Social Spending
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Figure 5.12 Percentage Change in Natural Resource Rents and Social Spending by Wave

Figure 5.12 shows the disaggregated results for the Pink Tide and non-Pink Tide
governments. For each 1% increase in natural resource rents, there will be a 0.17 % increase in
social expenditure for Pink Tide governments. Based on the Pearson correlation of 0.18, there is
a weak positive association between the two percent changes. Yet, its intercept is 142.37% which
is higher than the intercept for non-Pink Tide governments. This again supports the idea of Pink
Tide governments spending more on social expenditures than non-Pink Tide governments at no
levels of extraction. On the other hand, for each 1% increase in natural resource rents, there is a
0.48% increase in social expenditure for non-Pink Tide governments. Again, the non-Pink Tide
governments seem to have a proportional relationship between rents and social spending. Costa
Rica is actually one of the states with the highest welfare efforts in Latin America, and the
highest in Central America. Social expenditure in terms of social protection, education, and
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health was 21.1% of its GDP in 2015 (Huber 2019). Therefore, it makes sense that for the little
extraction it performs, it would have enough funds to contribute to social expenditure with its
small size and small population.
On the other hand, both Bolivia and Argentina are high extractors, yet their spending did
not drastically increase within the non-Pink Tide wave. While this is consistent with Pink Tide
cases instead of non-Pink Tide governments, the first wave in these countries happened earlier in
the century just when the Pink Tide was starting to form. Non-Pink Tide governments were in
power at the time. Argentina for example, experienced a great depression from 1998 to 2002
after the Washington Consensus and its GDP had shrunk by 28% (Pascoe 2012). Over half of its
population lived below the poverty line (Pascoe 2012). Therefore, it is not surprising that there
was a decrease in social spending in this wave as extraction was probably used to fund other
areas. Such a depression also affected the Bolivian economy. Under the non-Pink Tide leader
and former military dictator Hugo Banzer, neo-liberal policies were continued.
A caveat of percent change graphs is that it does not fully capture the large increases in
rents and expenditures within each wave. While this was not a problem for expenditure levels as
they seemed to be relatively stable overtime, it was true for rents in some cases. For example,
there is only one wave or data point for Pink Tide Venezuela and its initial resource rent as a
percentage of GDP was 11.52% in 1998. Yet, resource rents reached its peak at 28.24% in 2005
and decreased to 10.35% in the wave’s end in 2014.
In the next section, other determinants of welfare state quality are considered in addition
to extractive industry reliance and the Pink Tide. Using these economic, political, globalization,
and demographic determinants, a large-N first differenced analysis was performed to further
establish a closer relationship between neo-extractivism and the welfare state.
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Chapter VI. Large-N First Differenced Model
Additional Determinants of Human Capital Expenditures
I.

Economic Determinant
In addition to the natural resource rents variable mentioned in the previous section, the

economic variable that will be used for the large-N first differenced analysis is GDP per capita,
PPP. This is measured with “per capita values for gross domestic product (GDP) expressed in
current international dollars converted by purchasing power parity conversion factor” (GDP per
capita, PPP). The choice of using PPP stems from the fact that it is “a spatial price deflator,”
meaning that it “controls for price level differences between countries” (GDP per capita, PPP).
As different countries have different currencies with differences in living standards, the PPP is
essentially an exchange rate in which the currency in one country is converted into the currency
of another country, in this case the United States. Therefore, PPP considers the real sizes of
Latin American countries as it enables one to thoroughly compare the economic output of
different countries based on the standardized international dollar. The coefficient of this variable
when running the large-N analysis is expected to be positive as noted in the literature (Haggard
and Kaufman 2004; Huber et al. 2008; Martin-Mayoral and Sastre 2017). Such a prediction
reflects Adoph Wagner’s “Law of Increasing State Activity” which suggests that “the demand
for public services increases as countries become wealthier” (Haggard and Kaufman 2004). In
this respect, more economic development will yield more human capital expenditure to fulfill
social needs.
II.

Political Determinants
In addition to the Pink Tide variable, the political variables that will be used for this

analysis include democracy and tax revenue. Democracy will be measured based on the
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renowned Polity V score which is “computed by subtracting the autocracy score from the
democracy score” and ranges from -10 to 10 (Coppedge et al. 2021). There should be a positive
effect of regime type on human capital expenditures. Strongly institutionalized democratic
countries, which are coded 10 under the Polity V measure, allow a wide range of electoral
competition, power, and accountability over autocratic regimes (Huber et al. 2008). Essentially,
politicians in a democracy have more of an incentive to generate increased human capital
expenditures, especially since they face “higher social costs due to high electoral risks'' (MartinMayoral and Sastre 2017, 7). In addition, democratic regimes must “consider the whole
population in their welfare decisions'' so “the income of the median voter is lower” (MartinMayoral and Sastre 2017, 7). This implies a greater need for social assistance and services from
the government. On the other hand, strongly autocratic regimes which are coded -10, tend to
repress any challenges to their power while allowing real wages to deteriorate and reducing any
resources needed by its people (Huber et al. 2008). The income of the median voter in this case
would be higher since human capital investment would be intended for the authoritarian regime’s
“smaller group of supporters who benefit” (Martin-Mayoral and Sastre 2017, 7). Therefore, it is
expected that high Polity V scores may be associated with higher levels of human capital
expenditures. Tax revenue will be measured by the tax revenue as a percentage of GDP.
Tax rates are traditionally low in Latin America as the region has limited tax capacity due
to fragile institutions and high market informality. They depend on resource rents for financing
instead. Yet, their fiscal commitments are high and Latin American governments face high costs
when ignoring their constraints (Martin-Mayoral and Sastre 2017). Therefore, it would be
expected that higher tax revenues would finance more human capital investment.
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III.

Globalization Determinants
The three globalization variables that will be used include trade openness, government

debt, and foreign direct investment. Trade openness is measured by the total sum of exports and
imports as a percentage of GDP. Unlike Huber, Mustillo, and Stephens (2008) who adopted
a nondirectional hypothesis for trade openness, this paper expects that high levels of trade
openness will yield lower human capital expenditures. Trade dependent countries may face
“pressures to maintain and upgrade human capital” from the international community (Haggard
and Kaufman 2004, 18). Yet this does not seem true in the context of neo-extractivism as
“Chapter IV. The Gilded Welfare State” suggests. In fact, the very essence of extractivism is
based in the idea of trade since extractive countries are dependent on the global market to sell
their primary products. Yet, commodity prices are volatile. Wibbels (2006) finds that this
volatility causes sharp changes in the business cycle since governments have “limited ability to
borrow from international markets during negative output shocks” and economic crises (Wibbels
2006, 438). Therefore, governments may decrease human capital spending to balance their
budgets as less revenue, or rents are gained from extraction. 17 Government debt is measured by
the central government’s debt as a percentage of GDP. It is expected that the higher a
government’s debt, the more likely they will adopt austerity policies (Huber et al. 2008). It is
highly likely that Latin America may hope to avoid high public debts, instead opting to increase
taxes to fund spending or lower taxes and spending. Therefore, the coefficient of this variable
should be negative since governments might aim to decrease human capital expenditures to
avoid a further increase in public debt.

17

Balancing budgets means that revenues equal expenditures.
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The net inflows of foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP should have a
negative effect on all human capital expenditures. Employers in the business sector would
demand greater investment in education and health, for example, to “help them enhance [labor]
productivity and thereby improve their competitiveness” (Martin-Mayoral and Sastre 2017, 5).
Therefore, governments are encouraged to protect against the greater volatility and risk to avoid
political instability by essentially redistributing the gains from a globalized world and cultivating
a more business-friendly environment (Martin-Mayoral and Sastre 2017). Again, this does not
seem to be the case as extractive firms do not seem interested in cultivating human capital as
highlighted in “Chapter IV. The Gilded Welfare State.” Due to its extractive industry reliance
and “shallow domestic credit markets,” Latin American countries are dependent on international
financial markets to finance their fiscal budgets (Wibbels 2006, 444). As primary exports are
volatile as stated before, exchange rate volatility is capable of decreasing foreign direct
investment since investors tend to think of them as high risk. This would lower human capital
expenditures.
IV.

Demographic Determinants
The four demographic variables that will be used in the analysis include the urban,

elderly, and youth population, in addition to the Gini Coefficient. 18 The population variables
should have a positive effect on the human capital expenditures. The urban population variable is
measured by the percentage of the population that lives in areas defined as urban. Typically, the
poor and excluded urban population has more access to health, education, or social expenditures
in the form of CCTs for example, than those of a similar economic background in rural areas.
Therefore, as the urban population grows, there will be more of a need to invest in human

18

The Gini coefficient is endogenous, meaning that it is an effect of social spending but also a determinant of social
spending. This may create bias in the analysis.
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capital. The elderly population variable is measured as the population ages 65 and over as a
percentage of the total population. As the aging population grows, more funds should be
allocated towards health or retirement pensions which should increase social and health
expenditures (Martin-Mayoral and Sastre 2017).
On the other hand, the youth population variable is measured by the population between
the ages of 0 and 14 as a percentage of the total population. As the youth population grows, more
funds should be allocated towards primary health and primary education to better adapt to the
demographic trend. Huber, Mustillo, and Stephens (2008) find this relationship, essentially
noting that health expenditure increases with a higher youth population. The Gini Coefficient as
a percentage variable controls for the levels of inequality. As emphasized in “Chapter IV. The
Gilded Welfare State,” high levels of inequality may encourage governments to reorient their
human capital expenditures towards promoting inclusion, thus increasing health, education, and
social spending for previously excluded populations.
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Figure 6.1 Control Variable Descriptions, Data Sources, and Hypothesized Effects for Human
Capital Expenditure Levels in Latin America
Independent Variable

Description of Variable

Social

Education

Health

Economic Variables
1. GDP per Capita
(PPP)a

GDP per Capita, PPP (current
international $)

+

+

+

Political Variables
1. Regime Typed
2. Tax Revenuea

Polity V score

+

+

+

Tax Revenue (% of GDP)19

+

+

+

Sum of Exports and Imports (% of
GDP) 20

-

-

-

Central Government Debt (% of
GDP) 21

-

-

-

-

-

-

Urban population (% of total
population)

+

+

+

Population ages 65 and above (% of
total population)

+

-

+

Population ages 0-14 (% of total
population)

-

+

+

Gini Coefficient (%)

+

+

+

Globalization Variables
1. Trade Opennessb
2. Government Debtc
3. FDIa

Foreign Direct Investment, net
inflows (% of GDP)
Demographic Variables
1. Urban Populationa
2. Elderly Populationa
3. Youth Populationa
4. Inequalitya

Data Sources: aWorld Bank; bFeenstra et al. (2015) Penn World Tables version 9.1; cIMF; dVDem Indicators

19

All data is missing for Venezuela, Panama, and Ecuador.
Data is missing for 2018.
21
Data is missing for Panama and several observations for Venezuela and Peru.
20
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Statistical Tests for Latin American TSCS Data
I.

Data Characteristics
This paper uses the statistical computing software R to carry out any calculations and

regressions of the collected time-series cross-section (TSCS) data. TSCS data is “characterized
by having repeated observations of fixed units,” in this case Latin American countries, “with
each unit observed over a relatively long time period” (Beck and Katz 1995, 634). There are 21
observations for each of the 18 Latin America countries in the sample. This suggests that T, or
the number of years in the dataset, are almost equal to N, or the number of countries data is
available for. Latin American countries consist of Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. This leaves 378 observations
from 1998 to 2018. However, many observations are missing for several variables due to their
absence in the CEPALSTAT, World Bank, and IMF datasets. Therefore, this is an unbalanced
dataset as the number of observations for each unit of analysis, in this case each Latin American
country, are not the same.
Figure 6.2 displays three boxplots for each primary variable of analysis. There are not
many outliers or leverage points. There seems to be no outliers or leverage points for health
expenditure. The outlier for the education spending variable includes Costa Rica which spent
7.32% of the GDP on education in a non-Pink Tide year of 2017 that was not much higher than
the maximum expenditure on education. The outlier for the social spending variable includes
Venezuela which spent 18.76% of the GDP on social spending in 2014, a Pink Tide year. With
the exception of Brazil during 2016 to 2018 in non-Pink Tide years, countries that also spent the
most on social expenditure prominently experienced Pink Tide waves and included Chile,
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Uruguay, Venezuela, Brazil, and Argentina. Most values in the resource rents variable are
concentrated between 0 and 5% of GDP. Countries with predominant Pink Tide waves had the
highest resource rents. This included Venezuela, Chile, Ecuador, and Bolivia during the latter
half of the 2000s decade.
Figure 6.2 Boxplots of Primary Variables of Analysis

As shown in Figure 6.3, this skews the distribution of resource rents to the right, or higher values
while the distribution of the human capital expenditures appear to be more normal. 22 Though the
resource rents data points seem to be influential or contain high enough leverage to disregard
them, these points will not be excluded from the analysis. This paper hopes to understand
whether differences exist in Pink Tide and non-Pink Tide spending in relation to natural resource

22

In hindsight, the logarithm of the natural resource rents variable should have been taken in response to the
skewness in the data.
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rents so excluding such points might be unfavorable for analysis if such substantial differences
appear to be supported in the large-N analysis.
Figure 6.3 Histograms of Primary Variables of Analysis

II.

Justification of First Differenced Estimation
Several different OLS regression models were considered to explain the relationship

between natural resource reliance and human capital expenditure. A pooled OLS model 23 was
initially considered. However, it does not account for the fact that the TSCS data points come
from many different countries instead of one. When using TSCS, heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation becomes a common concern as they bias any results and violate the assumptions
for using the model (Hunter and Brown 1999). For example, heteroskedasticity means that “each
country may have its own error variance” while the model imposes one error variance for all

23

When running a pooled model, the coefficients were consistent with the first differenced model. The results can
be found in Appendix A.
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(Beck 2001). Autocorrelation means that “the errors for a given country are correlated with
previous errors for that country” (Beck 2001). This means that the errors are not independent and
identically distributed as the model assumes. A common method in the literature for addressing
this problem is by using a lagged dependent as a regressor which eliminates autocorrelation, and
then using panel corrected standard errors to correct for heteroskedasticity in the error term
(Beck and Katz 1995). Attempts were made to use the lagged dependent variable as a regressor
but the correlation coefficient on the lagged dependent variable was very close to one. This
means that there is little change from one year to the next. 24 It also suggests that the variable is
integrated which suppresses the explanatory power of the other independent variable whose
effects may also be significant in explaining human capital expenditures. Therefore, a lagged
dependent variable was not used to perform the estimation.
Instead, every independent variable was each lagged one year backward to account for
the fact that any political or economic development “takes time to affect political decisions and
policy outcomes” (Hunter and Brown 1999, 781). Each variable was then differenced which
“eliminates a substantial portion of the cross-nation variation” (Hunter and Brown 1999, 785).
First differencing25 also assumes “that something within the [country] may impact or bias the
predictor or outcome variables” (Torres-Reyna 2007). Therefore, observable and unobservable
time-invariant factors that are unique to each country are controlled for such as the country’s
size, national policies, political system, and resource abundance (Torres-Reyna 2007).
Though first-differencing the variables tends to only showcase the short-term effects
from year to year (Huber et al. 2008, 429), this is justifiable in the case of this paper. As

24

I appreciate Professor Weber for pointing this out.
In this case, it is important to note that first difference estimators and fixed effects estimators are identical when
using two time periods, or T=2, for each country-year unit of analysis.
25
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spending levels seemed to have stayed the same in the long term, it may be more useful to
understand how the election of Pink Tide governments in the region may have influenced human
capital expenditures as opposed to non-Pink Tide governments in the region. After running the
Breusch-Godfrey/Wooldridge statistical test26 based on the Lagrange multiplier test for serial
autocorrelation in the errors of the regression model, it confirmed that autocorrelation was no
longer a concern for the data. Therefore, heteroskedasticity becomes the last area of concern. A
Breusch-Pagan statistical test27 was run to test whether heteroskedasticity is indeed present in the
TSCS. As expected, the test confirmed that heteroskedasticity was present which suggest the
need for heteroskedasticity consistent covariance estimators for robust standard errors.
Therefore, heteroskedasticity was corrected using panel corrected standard errors as
recommended by Beck and Katz (1995) and used by Hunter and Brown (1999), Martin-Mayoral
and Sastre (2017), and Huber, Mustillo, and Stephens (2008).
Ultimately, this is the model used for the analysis: HCEXPit = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1RENTSit-1+
𝛽2PINKTIDEit-1+ 𝛽3DEMOCRACYit-1 + 𝛽4GDPPCit-1 + 𝛽5TRADEit-1+ 𝛽6FDIit-1 + 𝛽7DEBTit-1 +
𝛽8URBANit-1 + 𝛽9ELDERLYit-1 + 𝛽8YOUTHit-1+ 𝛽9RENTSit-1*PINKTIDEit-1 + ∈ , where HCEXP is
it

it

country i’s various types of human capital expenditures (health, education, and social) in period t, RENTS
is natural resource rents as a percentage of GDP, PINKTIDE is the presence of the Pink Tide,
DEMOCRACY is the Polity V score, GDPPC is the logged GDP per capita (PPP, in current international
dollars), TRADE is the sum of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP, FDI is the net inflows of
foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP, DEBT is the central government debt as a percentage

26

The null hypothesis is that there is no serial correlation in the errors while the alternative hypothesis is that there is
serial correlation in the errors. Since the p-values of 0.59 for education, 0.52 for social, and 0.06 for health were all
greater than the 0.05 significance level at, I fail to reject the null hypothesis and conclude there is no serial
correlation.
27
The null hypothesis is that heteroskedasticity is not present, or that the data is homoscedastic. The alternative
hypothesis is that heteroskedasticity is present. Since the p-values for education, social, and health were all less than
0, I reject the null hypothesis at the 0.05 level and conclude that there is heteroskedasticity in the TSCS data.
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of GDP, URBAN is the urban population as a percentage of total population, ELDERLY is the elderly
population as a percentage of total population, YOUTH is the youth population as a percentage of total
population. The last two terms are the interaction term of natural resource rents as a percentage of GDP at
t-1 multiplied by the presence of the Pink Tide in period t-1, and the error term.
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Results of Human Capital First Differenced Model
Figure 6.4 displays the results of the first differenced model run for each dimension of
human capital investment. 28
Figure 6.4 Estimates of the Determinants of Latin American Human Capital Expenditure

28

In order to use the fullest extent of the TSCS data, the Gini Coefficient and Tax variables were dropped from the
primary analysis due to a large amount of missing data. Nevertheless, the coefficients of the variables did not change
much when including them in the analysis. The results can be found in Appendix B.

Ramcharan 78
I.

Determinants of Health Expenditure
Overall, the adjusted R squared means that 44% of the variation in health expenditure as

a percentage of GDP within Latin American countries can be explained by the independent
variables listed in Figure 6.4. Based on the model, the coefficient 29 of the natural resource rents
variable is negative and statistically significant at the 0.001 significance level. The non-Pink
Tide marginal effects plot for natural resource rents and health expenditure with a 95%
confidence interval is shown in Figure 6.5. Holding the other variables constant, this suggests
that in non-Pink Tide governments, health expenditure as a percentage of GDP decreases by 0.14
percentage points, on average per country-year, when natural resource rents as a percentage of
GDP increases by one percent. This is more impactful than in Pink Tide governments where
health spending decreases by 0.05 percentage points on average per country-year. Though this is
consistent with the hypothesis as natural resource rents are expected to have a negative effect on
health expenditure, it is inconsistent as the negative effect should have been stronger for Pink
Tide countries.

29

The coefficients are not t-values.

Ramcharan 79
Figure 6.5 Marginal Effects Plot for Natural Resource Rents and Health Expenditure

The Pink Tide variable is also statistically significant at the 0.10 significance level. Its
coefficient is negative instead of positive. This is consistent with the hypothesis but can be
attributed to other reasons that will be addressed in “Discussion of Results.” The marginal effects
plot for the Pink Tide variable and health expenditure as a share of GDP is shown in Figure 6.6.
On average per country-year, it is expected that health expenditure as a share of GDP in Pink
Tide governments will be 0.64 percentage points less than non-Pink Tide governments at the
same level of natural resource rents. Again, this runs contrary to the hypothesis as the negative
effect should have been stronger for Pink Tide governments.
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Figure 6.6 Marginal Effects Plot for Pink Tide and Health Expenditure

Interestingly enough, the interaction term between the Pink Tide variable and natural
resource rents is significant at the 0.05 level. The interaction plot for natural resource rents and
the Pink Tide variable is shown in Figure 6.7. The intercept for countries with non-Pink Tide
waves is 9.62% while the intercept for countries with Pink Tide waves is lower at 8.72%. At low
values of natural resource rents, countries with non-Pink Tide waves spend more on health than
Pink Tide governments. At high values of natural resource rents, countries with Pink Tide waves
spend more on health than countries with non-Pink Tide waves. Based on the interaction, it
seems that Pink Tide governments tend to maintain more consistent levels of expenditure since
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its slope of -0.04 is less steep than that of non-Pink Tide cases. There is no overall effect of
either the Pink Tide or natural resource rents, but there is a crossover interaction. The effect of
Pink Tide on health expenditure is the opposite, depending on the value of natural resource
rents.
Figure 6.7 Interaction Plot for Pink Tide and Natural Resource Rents on Health Expenditure

II.

Determinants of Education Expenditure
The adjusted R squared means that 64% of the variation in education expenditure as a

percentage of GDP within Latin American countries can be explained by the independent
variables listed in Figure 6.4. This is higher than the R squared of the health model. According to
Figure 6.4, the natural resource rents variable is not statistically significant. Though it is negative
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as expected, its coefficient is much closer to 0 than the health expenditure model. This suggests
that natural resource rents may have little to no effect on education expenditure. The non-Pink
Tide marginal effects plot for natural resource rents and education expenditure with a 95%
confidence interval is shown in Figure 6.8. Holding the other variables constant, this suggests
that in non-Pink Tide governments, education expenditure as a percentage of GDP decreases by
0.02, on average per country-year, when natural resource rents as a percentage of GDP increases
by one percent. This insignificant impact is less in Pink Tide governments where education
spending as a percentage of GDP decreases by 0.04 percentage points on average per countryyear. This is consistent with the hypothesis but not with the literature.
Figure 6.8 Marginal Effects Plot for Natural Resource Rents and Education Expenditure
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The coefficient of the Pink Tide variable is statistically significant at the 0.01 significance
level. Yet unlike the health expenditure model, the coefficient of the Pink Tide variable is
positive. This does not support the hypothesis presented in this paper, but it does support the
literature. The marginal effects plot for the Pink Tide variable and education expenditure is
shown in Figure 6.9. On average per country-year, it is expected that education expenditure as a
share of GDP in Pink Tide governments will be 0.32 percentage points greater than non-Pink
Tide governments at the same level of natural resource rents.
Figure 6.9 Marginal Effects Plot for Pink Tide and Education Expenditure
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The interaction plot of the education interaction has almost parallel lines instead of
intersecting ones, suggesting that it did not behave like health like previously thought in
“Chapter V. Medium-N First Differenced Model.” It seems that in the case of education, the Pink
Tide did have a significant albeit negligible effect on how much a government spends on
education in terms of resource rents as these governments seem to spend more than non-Pink
Tide ones.
Figure 6.10 Interaction Plot for Pink Tide and Natural Resource Rents on Education Expenditure

III.

Determinants of Social Expenditure
According to the adjusted R squared, 57% of the variation in social expenditure as a

percentage of GDP within Latin American countries can be explained by the independent
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variables listed in Figure 6.4. Based on the model in Figure 6.4, the coefficient of the natural
resource rents variable is negative like in the health model but statistically insignificant. The
non-Pink Tide marginal effects plot for natural resource rents and social expenditure with a 95%
confidence interval is shown in Figure 6.11. Holding the other variables constant, this suggests
that in non-Pink Tide governments, social expenditure as a percentage of GDP decreases by 0.05
percentage points, on average per country-year, when natural resource rents as a percentage of
GDP increases by one percent. This has about the same impact as Pink Tide governments where
social spending as a percentage of GDP decreases by 0.04 percentage points, on average per
year. This is consistent with the hypothesis as natural resource rents are expected to have a
negative effect on social expenditure. Like the education model, the coefficient in this model is
closer to 0 which suggests resource rents has almost no effect on social expenditure.
Figure 6.11 Marginal Effects Plot for Natural Resource Rents and Social Expenditure
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Like the natural resource rents variable, the Pink Tide variable is also not statistically
significant. Its coefficient is negative instead of positive which supports the hypothesis. The
marginal effects plot for the Pink Tide variable and social expenditure is shown in Figure 6.12.
On average per country-year, it is expected that social expenditure as a share of GDP in Pink
Tide governments will be 0.09 percentage points less than non-Pink Tide governments at the
same level of natural resource rents.
Figure 6.12 Marginal Effects Plot for Pink Tide and Social Expenditure

The interaction term between the Pink Tide variable and natural resource rents is
statistically insignificant. The interaction plot for natural resource rents and the Pink Tide
variable is shown in Figure 6.13. The intercept for countries with non-Pink Tide waves is 7.83%
while the intercept for countries with Pink Tide waves is lower at 7.64%, but not by much. At
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very low values of natural resource rents, countries with non-Pink Tide waves spend more on
health than Pink Tide governments. At medium to high values of natural resource rents,
countries with Pink Tide waves spend more on social expenditure than countries with non-Pink
Tide waves. The difference in the slopes is 0.02. Based on the interaction, it seems that Pink Tide
governments may tend to maintain more consistent levels of expenditure since its slope of -0.08
is less steep than that of non-Pink Tide cases. There is no overall effect of either the Pink Tide or
natural resource rents, but there is a crossover interaction. The effect of Pink Tide on social
expenditure is the opposite, depending on the value of natural resource rents.

Figure 6.13 Interaction Plot for Pink Tide and Natural Resource Rents on Social Expenditure
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Discussion of Results
I.

A Recap of Results
Overall, the first differenced model has failed to provide any strong evidence for natural

resource rents affecting human capital investment. The results even ran contrary to the results
presented in “Chapter V. Medium-N First Differenced Model” which found a positive
relationship between natural resource rents and human capital expenditures. Perhaps the
introduction of the control variables or large-N model specifications can best explain this
contradiction. Yet though insignificant, similar studies have also found a negative relationship
between the variables (Turan and Yanikkaya 2020; Oyinlol et al. 2019; Blanco and Grier 2012).
In their study of more than 100 countries during 1980 to 2015, Turan and Yanikkaya (2020, 449)
disaggregated the natural resource rents variable into oil, mineral, and gas rents and found that
though not significant, rents had an “adverse effect on the human capital.” Consistent with
Blanco and Grier (2012) who performed an analysis of 17 Latin American countries between
1975 and 2004, their results were negative but inconclusive as well.
This negative relationship can also be explained by the most prominent theory concerning
extraction and the political economy — the Resource Curse.30 According to the Natural Resource
Governance Institute (2015, 1), the resource curse “refers to the failure of many resource-rich
countries to benefit fully from their natural resource wealth.” While it is expected that such
countries are able to improve the standards of living, these countries instead “tend to have higher
rates of conflict and authoritarianism, and lower rates of economic stability and economic
growth” when compared to countries without natural resource discoveries (NRGI 2015,1).
Therefore, the government has a limited ability to capture the true benefits of extraction and

30

This is also known as the “paradox of plenty.”

Ramcharan 89
substantively respond to the needs of its constituents as shown in Figure 6.14 and explained more
fully by the mechanisms identified in “Chapter IV. The Gilded Welfare State.”
Figure 6.14 “Oversight Incentives in Resource-Rich and Resource-Poor Countries”

II.

An Unexpected Economic Efficiency
It is also possible that neo-extractive funds were allocated into other areas of human

capital expenditure that were not considered in this paper. This paper only considers health,
education, and social expenditure as measurements of human capital investment. Yet, there are a
myriad of human capital investment opportunities for both Pink Tide and non-Pink Tide
governments. For one, governments could have funneled excess profit and revenue from
extractivism into job training or even minimum wage. In 2008, natural resource rents in Brazil
had reached its peak at 6.18% of the GDP. About a year later during the presidency of Brazil’s
Pink Tide President Lula da Silva, the minimum wage was raised from 415 reals to 465 reals
($200.95), a 6.4% increase in 2009 (Reuters Staff 2009). This injection of 21 billion reals into
Brazil’s economy suggests that the state had the financial means to invest in its working
population, possibly from its gains in natural resource rents (Reuters Staff 2009). In a similar
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guise, social expenditure which was used as a dependent variable in this paper was measured
only in terms of health, education, and social protection. Yet, there are other dimensions of the
variable that were not included in the analysis such as housing and housing amenities
(Indicators). Ensuring that everyone has equal access to housing and “constructing and
remodeling” housing “for the general public or persons with special needs” supports the idea of
Latin American welfare states allocating more extractive funds into this area of human capital
formation. Therefore, the negative relationship between extractive industry reliance and human
capital investment could be attributed to a larger economic pie, one that may potentially decrease
the amount of health, education, and social expenditure as a share of GDP while actually
increasing other areas of human capital expenditures in the economy.
III.

Differences in Expenditures
As the model in “Chapter VI. Large-N First Differenced Model” has also indicated, the

human capital expenditures appear to be inconsistent in the presence of the Pink Tide. For
example, the positive statistically significant coefficient of the Pink Tide variable when
considering education expenditure is particularly noteworthy as it conforms to the literature.
Though it was expected that education would behave like health as they are both social services,
the results suggest that Pink Tide governments seem to spend more on education. Perhaps they
noted the “high political cost in education” as it pertains to teacher unions and students (Holland
and Schneider 2017b). Key aspects of the Pink Tide included increasing equal opportunity and
socioeconomic mobility through education. Facing political pressures from students and teachers
who would protest public education funding and inequality 31, Pink Tide governments would
probably feel more pressure to invest in education than deal with the creation of social

31

For example, Chile in 2011-2013 faced massive student-led protests. Students demanded the end of the Chilean
school voucher system, better financing for education, and more state management of the public education system.
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movements. This may explain why Pink Tide governments allocated more expenditure into
education than non-Pink Tide governments. In addition to this, the statistically significant
coefficient of the natural resource rents coefficient when considering health expenditure is
steeper when compared to the coefficients for education and social spending. When governments
receive any revenues, it is possible that they funnel it into health expenditures due to the “high
economic cost” (Holland and Schneider 2017b). Therefore, they are more likely to invest the
money into more visible projects like building hospitals. It is possible that when receiving
natural resource rents, governments have already secured more stable sources of financing like
taxation for health as it is a high priority for politicians and constituents. Therefore, they use the
rents to finance other areas.
IV.

A Calm Pink Tide
On the other hand, there may not be much of a difference between countries with Pink

Tide waves and countries with non-Pink Tide waves in terms of extraction as the findings of the
model suggest. Holland and Schneider (2017a, 989) highlight that “political competition and
partisan swings leave much unexplained.” This suggests that attributing any changes in human
capital expenditure cannot merely be explained by whether the government is Pink Tide or not.
There are countless other factors that can affect expenditures that were not used in this model
such as the amount of tax revenue collected, unemployment, and inflation rates. In addition, nonPink and Pink Tide governments both “reduced inequality, expanded social spending, and
introduced targeted poverty-relief programs in the 2000s” (Holland and Schneider 2017a, 989).
Indeed, this is true. Policies such as CCTs and NCPs that are “popular and electorally beneficial”
were passed by both Pink and non-Pink Tide governments and “few politicians, from the Left
and the Right, can afford to revoke them” (Holland and Schneider 2017a, 1000). In addition,
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these CCTs and NCPs were passed by both Pink Tide and non-Pink Tide governments due to
their versatile characteristics. For one, Holland and Schneider (2017b) note that implementing
these programs was easy since they were not costly to implement due to ATMs. As both
governments are electorally motivated, it would be no surprise to see that human capital
investments into CCTs or NCPs would happen at faster rates than in health, education, minimum
wage, or other areas. In addition, the Pink Tide does not seem to affect natural resource rent
extraction and therefore, may not have a significant impact on human capital investment.
V.

Unaccounted Exogenous Shocks
The model in “Chapter VI. Large-N First Differenced Model” notably does not account

for any exogenous shocks that may have influenced how natural resource rents affect human
capital investment. Accounting for the 2008-2009 world financial crisis using a dummy variable
in the analysis was considered. However, it was ultimately decided against since most Latin
American states in the region were resilient during this shock. Perhaps Latin America learned its
lessons from its 1980s debt crisis as it was able to largely shield itself from macroeconomic
instability “with much better monetary policy, substantially lower fiscal deficits, and improved
debt management” (Levy and Schady 2013, 193). Accounting for the Commodities Boom of
2002 to the early 2010s with a dummy variable should have also been considered. It should be
noted that the election of Pink Tide and non-Pink Tide governments in the region also coincided
with a high international demand for natural resources and commodities as China’s economy
grew (Blanco and Grier 2013). When the boom was over, it was possible that Latin American
countries had to find other sources of financing for its social programs that were not extraction
centered and if they failed, that would probably be detrimental to forming their welfare state.
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Considering the results and discussion of this section, this paper will highlight some of
the key implications of this paper’s findings and suggestions for future research in “VII.
Conclusion.”
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Chapter VII. Conclusion
Set at the backdrop of neo-extractivism when Pink Tide governments exercised greater
state control over the appropriation of natural resources, this paper attempted to evaluate the
extent to which extractive industry reliance in Latin America affects the formation of welfare
states. Using a human capital perspective on the welfare state, this paper placed a strong
emphasis on the role of extractive industries in forming human capital. While the literature
suggested a positive association between extractive industry reliance in terms of natural resource
rents and human capital investment in terms of health, education, and social expenditures, this
paper challenged that assertion using the “gilded welfare state.” Through the use of two
mechanisms, namely the extractive industries’ large influence on the state’s redistributive power
and its inability to generate formal employment in Latin American society, this paper shows that
despite widespread social improvements, neo-extractivism may be unable to add substantive and
long-lasting benefits to the welfare state. This paper did not find conclusive results of the
relationship between natural resource rents and human capital formation since the medium-N
first differenced model showed evidence of a positive relationship while the large-N first
differenced model showed evidence of a negative relationship. Yet, it does suggest that neoextractivism should not be discounted from conversations concerning the development of the
welfare state.
More mechanisms of extractive industries should be identified and tied to human capital
formation in the welfare state. Only two were uncovered in this paper, namely the extractive
industries’ influence on the state’s redistributive power and its ability to generate employment
within Latin American society. Yet, there are a myriad of other mechanisms that extractive
industries may use to shape the welfare state. For one, the ownership of extractive firms may
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have differing impacts on human capital formation in terms of providing equal opportunity and
employment. Comparing nationalized and privatized extractive firms may hold some insight into
why some extractive industries are more able to integrate excluded communities than others.
This can be done by applying the principle-agent model to understand the inner workings of the
extractive firm such as the quality of management, the enforcement of human capital initiatives,
and the structure of the decision-making processes.
In a future iteration of this project, it would be useful to compare human capital
expenditures to a category of non-welfare spending. This may provide some insight into the
extent to which Pink Tide and non-Pink Tide governments prioritize human capital formation
relative to categories of non-human capital formation. This may include categories such as
national defense, infrastructure, or even transportation. Disaggregating human capital
expenditures would help one better understand how human capital expenditures associated with
natural resource rents are distributed. As Hunter and Brown (1999, 789) suggest, education
expenditures should be “disaggregated into primary and secondary versus university education”
while “health expenditures need to be broken down into basic preventative care versus costly
curative programs.” This would aid researchers in understanding whether resource rents are
allocated towards programs, services, or assistance aimed at increasing equal opportunity for the
poor as opposed to programs favorable to the upper and middle classes. It would be useful to
understand who truly benefits from the allocation of rents in terms of human capital expenditure
and whether extractive industry reliance is able to empower traditionally excluded communities.
Yet instead of using the expenditure approach as a measurement of human capital
investment, alternate measures of the dependent variable should be used in future research. As
stated before, the issue with expenditures rests on the fact that they measure how much is spent
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rather than how it is spent. Therefore, it would be beneficial to consider other more sophisticated
measures of human capital formation such as primary school enrollment, infant mortality rate,
and total social spending. Of course, other perspectives other than the human capital formation
aspect of the welfare state should also be considered such as decommodification and
stratification. The welfare state entails multiple dimensions instead of just the one mentioned
throughout this paper.
Future research should also consider using neo-extractivism as the basis of a new
typology of welfare states in Latin America. This may make it easier to compare and understand
Pink and non-Pink Tide welfare efforts in the Latin American region. For example, Filgueira
(2005) had used the characteristics of the import substitution industrialization (ISI) model, the
dominant development and economic model of Latin America before the emergence of exportoriented industrialization (EOI) and later, neo-extractivism. He finds three types of welfare
states, or what he calls social states, based on the economic inclusivity of the model and its
interaction with “the organization and response elites have to the pressure of subordinate sectors”
(Filgueira 2005, 10). These include “stratified universalistic, dual and exclusionary” (Filgueira
2005, 10). As this typology is outdated since it focuses on the path dependence of the states until
1970s, perhaps a similar continuum can be applied to the concept of neo-extractivism in the
contemporary setting. It has been shown throughout this paper that neo-extractivism as an
economic and developmental model has at least some impact on human capital formation
whether positive or negative. By considering the degrees of influence neo-extractivism has on
the state’s redistributive process and the extent to which it can create employment opportunities,
this new typology may be key to understanding the variation of Latin American welfare state
formation.
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In partnership with governments, extractive industries must move beyond short-term
CSR practices towards long term development plans that empower traditionally excluded
communities in the welfare state. Less than 10% of workers are women in Latin America’s
mining industry while less than 15% are directly and indirectly employed in the oil and gas
industries (Calot and Vallenilla 2018). Therefore, the mining, oil, and gas industries in Peru
launched the first “Program for Emerging Women Leaders of the Extractive Sector” in 2018 with
the support of the Canadian government and the Inter-American Development Bank (Calot and
Vallenilla 2018). Its aims are “to promote more women in managerial positions and serve as a
multi-actor collaborative platform that can take advantage of existing national initiatives and
promote gender equality” (Calot 2018). The program which trains women from the public and
private sectors has resulted in promotions for 52% of them and short-term job rotations for 38%
of them (Calot and Vallenilla 2018) This economically empowers women as they are able to
obtain the high skillset needed for formal employment. Such an initiative seems profitable for the
industry as well since Panama and the Dominican Republic have adapted it for their public
sectors. In addition, having women participate in the extractive industry yields better outcomes
for human capital formation. As opposed to men who tend to focus on extractive firms providing
infrastructure such as roads and buildings, women tend to ask for “better health and education
outcomes by improving services at existing facilities” (Calot and Vallenilla 2018). Such a move
towards human capital investment by the extractive industry benefits all parties.
A strengthening of the quality of existing institutions should also be warranted as
suggested by this paper. All too often, it is difficult to monitor where the revenues from natural
resource extraction will be allocated or how the revenues will be managed. As seen in “Chapter
IV. The Gilded Welfare State,” this creates an atmosphere of corruption that prevents the state
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from receiving the full spoils from extraction. In a move towards increased transparency, both
Pink and non-Pink Tide governments must encourage extractive industries to disclose
information pertaining to its chain of decision making. In addition to reporting the amount of
revenue gained from extraction, extractive industries must also disclose the location and duration
of projects, tax rates, and payments. Contracts should be made public with the avoidance of
confidentiality clauses and concessions approved by government legislatures. While not an
exhaustive list, this should at least increase the accountability of extractive industries as
governments and the public will be more able to scrutinize extractive firm practices.
Burchardt and Dietz (2014, 478) note that it would be useful for the political economy of
Latin America if there was some way to turn the quantitative increase in natural resource rents
“into a qualitative form of redistribution and a permanent expansion of social rights, formalized
employment, and stable social participation.” Perhaps most interesting is Paul Segal’s (2009, 1)
study in which he explores the possibility of each country distributing its natural “resource rents
directly to its citizens as a universal and unconditional cash transfer.” With his model, it is
expected that “if every developing country implemented the policy then the number of people
living below the World Bank’s $1-a-day global poverty line would be halved” (Segal 2009, 1)
While not a completely radical idea at this point, this would only contribute to the issues
highlighted in this paper. For one, cash transfers do not seem to add lasting and substantive
benefits to welfare state formation. It may further disincentivize people to become formal
workers with taxing capacity and legitimize neo-extractivism as the key source of social
development. Perhaps the creation of a new institution to ensure better allocation of natural
resource rents and prioritization of the well-being of communities in the spheres of extraction is
needed. For example, Ecuador created Ecuador Estratégico (EE) which is “a public company
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founded by the government in 2011 and tasked with providing compensation to communities''
who were directly affected by extractive industries (Fitz-Henry and Rodriguez 2020, 90). Yet,
this also further legitimizes the idea of exploiting the earth as a means for social development
which as this paper suggests, does not seem to actually work.
Latin American citizens have become more aware of the environmental, political,
economic, and social ramifications of extraction and have actively been working against
extractive projects. In Chile for example, both the $3.2 billion “mega-hydroelectric Hydroaysen
project” and the $8.5 billion “Pascua Lama gold mine” were cancelled due to widespread
protests over environmental concerns (Grantham Institute 2021). In Colombia, 98% of the
residents of rural Cajamarca including Afro-Colombians and peasant farmers voted against the
La Colosa mine despite death threats from the extractive firm, AngloGold Ashanti (Moore
2017). Yet, extractive industries and firms should not violently suppress these movements or
exercise of political power. Instead, they must learn to respect the social and property rights of
these communities for the survival of the region.
Ideally, moving towards more sustainable initiatives will yield a post-extractive world in
which nature is abandoned as a means to an end for social development. This must undoubtedly
be the goal for policymakers, governments, extractive firms, and communities as Latin America
endures the threat of two seemingly incurable ills — climate change and inequality. Extraction
worsens both of these ills as it threatens diverse ecosystems and displaces vulnerable
communities. Latin America is already bearing the brunt of climate change with temperatures
“projected to rise between 1°C to 4°C by the end of the century” (Cavallo 2020). Millions have
already been affected by severe climate-related events such as more frequent and intense
hurricanes, earthquakes, drought, and flash flooding. Yet, the impact of such natural disasters
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disproportionately falls on the poor as they “are more vulnerable and less prepared” for such ills
(Cavallo 2020). There must be ways to mitigate extraction and work towards more sustainable
initiatives as a means towards building a more sustainable welfare state. Unlike extractive
industries, excluded communities may be able to provide the technological innovations needed to
alleviate these ills. Due to climate change, wet seasons are wetter and dry seasons are drier. Drier
seasons are not ideal for local excluded farmers as they depend on safe drinking water for their
crops and animals. In order to improve water security in coastal Peru, local Ecuadorian scientist
Dr. Boris Ochoa-Tocachi hopes to extend the wet season by using the irrigation systems of preIncan indigenous communities (Grantham Institute 2021). This not only empowers excluded
communities who have unique insight into such issues. It also demonstrates how indigenous
knowledge can creatively be integrated with modern science to adapt to an unpredictable climate.
Yet, the move towards a post-extractive world cannot be completed overnight. Such a
transition requires unwavering cooperation between the major actors as well as the continued
political and economic empowerment of excluded communities. While the supply of finite
natural resources decreases, the demand for natural resources keeps increasing as emerging
economies continue to grow. States still believe extraction yields the economic growth essential
to reducing poverty and providing social protection. Extractive industries still fail to move
towards more renewable energy. Attempts at political and economic empowerment still results in
punishment. It is imperative in the present moment that each gram of gold mined yields the
highest possible benefit to society. However, extraction should never be conflated with social
development.
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